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1PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES AND THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
While scholars have written extensively on the substantive issues raised by the Internet and the 
possible application of copyright in the digital age, collecting societies remain absent from the 
discussions. Yet, copyrights would be of little value without the collective management performed by 
these societies. In 1986, Dr Arpad Bosh, the then Director General of WIPO, stated that “With 
galloping technological developments, collective administration of such rights is becoming an ever 
more important way of exercising copyright and neighbouring rights. Taking into account its 
increasing importance, much more attention should be paid to it, both at the national and at the 
international levels”. The goal of this paper is to address this concern. Based upon a non random 
sample of interviews that were conducted in December 2005 and January 2006 with 7 collecting 
societies (4 European, 2 North American and 1 Japanese), this exploratory research aims at finding
how collecting societies operate in the digital environment regarding the ubiquitous nature of the 
Internet, and what their concerns and perspectives are for the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since England passed the first copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 17101, copyright 
has always been confronted by technological innovations. The tremendous impact of the 
Internet and its related technological innovations are the latest step in this evolution. Thanks 
to the Internet, works can now be disseminated throughout the globe simultaneously at any 
given time and reproductions can be made without investment or loss of quality. For these 
reasons, the Internet raises several questions about the applicability of copyright to the digital 
environment. Quite logically, these issues have led to passionate and disputed discussions 
among legal scholars2, and caused governments to adopt new treaties3, an EU directive4 and 
national legislation implementing these international agreements.
1 http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. While the Statute of Ann is often said to have been enacted in 
1709, a careful reading of the Act on this website clearly shows that the Act actually was actually enacted in 
1710.
2 See, among others : in the US : JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); in France: ANDRE LUCAS, DROIT 
D’AUTEUR ET NUMERIQUE (1998); in Switzerland: LUKAS BÜHLER, URHEBERRECHT IM INTERNET (1999); in 
Belgium: SEVERINE DUSSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L’UNIVERS NUMERIQUE –
DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS A LA LUMIERE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES ŒUVRES (2005) ; in Germany : 
STEFAN BECHTOLD, VOM URHEBER- ZUM INFORMATIONSRECHT (2002).
3
 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), known as “Internet 
Treaties” (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ and http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/). On these 
treaties, see: MIHALY MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND INTERNET (2002). 
4
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (hereafter: EC Directive on the 
Information Society), available at (http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML). 
3So far the music industry has been the most concerned with the online exploitation of 
copyrighted works. The importance of digital music is growing each year. The exchange of 
music files made possible thanks to the development of p2p systems became a way of life for 
millions of consumers. According to the International Confederation of Societies of Authors 
and Composers (CISAC)5, 150 billion musical works were transmitted illegally on the 
Internet in 2003 (while there were “only” 3 billion in 1999 and 36 billion in 2000)6. While 
CISAC does not yet have any figure for 2003, the estimated loss in 2001 for the music
industry was of USD 4.3 billion7. 
The p2p phenomenon thus left no choice for the recording industry but to offer a more 
consumer friendly business model if it wanted to stop losing revenues. In 2001, Universal and 
Sony were the first to open their online music store with “Pressplay”. EMI, AOL/Time, 
Warner and BMG followed with “MusicNet”. However, the high prices charged by these 
companies and heavy usage limitations proved unlikely to raise the interests of consumers. 
Far from having any deterrent effect, the percentage of consumers using p2p exchange files 
systems went on rising to reach its peak in May 2003 with 35 million users in a sole month8. 
On May 19, 2003, Sony and Universal finally gave up and sold “Pressplay” to Roxio, which 
5 As of 2004, CISAC numbers 210 authors' societies from 109 countries and indirectly represents more than 2 
million creators within all the artistic repertoires: music, drama, literature, audio-visual works, graphic and visual 
arts (http://www.cisac.org). 
6 http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=FR&Alias=MAN-AR-05. 
7 http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=MAN-AR-05. 
These figures can of course be disputed and have actually been disputed. See in particular Felix Oberholzer and 
Koleman Strumpf, according to whom file sharing would not have any statistically significant effect on 
purchases of the average music album and that file sharing probably increases aggregate welfare due to increased 
dissemination of music (“The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales. An Empirical Analysis”, at 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf). 
8
 Mary Madden/Lee Rainie, The state of music downloading and file-sharing online (April 2004, Pew Internet & 
American Life Project), at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Filesharing_April_04.pdf; see also Mary 
Madden/Lee Rainie, The impact of recording industry suits against music file swappers (January 2004, Pew 
Internet & American Life Project), at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_File_Swapping_Memo_0104.pdf.
4used it as a base to relaunch the Napster online music store9. One month before, Apple had 
however launched in the United States a service that would prove the viability of online music 
sales and become a model; this model was iTunes. Unlike previous online music stores, 
iTunes has several advantages: it allows a free preview of 30 seconds per song for a price of 
USD 0.99 per download, respectively USD 9.99 for an album, an amount that reflected the 
projected price announced one year earlier by Jupiter Research, a market research firm10. The 
system is easy to use and the à la carte pricing model makes the music store feel like p2p in 
certain ways, thanks to fast searching and a one click purchasing mechanism. The DRM used 
by Apple, called “FairPlay” has acceptable restraints: users can use the songs downloaded on 
five computers and can make unlimited CD burns of their songs11. Most importantly, unlike 
its predecessors, Apple has secured the participation of content providers before its release on 
the market. Thanks to the support of the majors and over 600 independent labels, iTunes 
proposes a catalogue of more than 2 millions songs. ITunes quickly expanded its services to 
other countries to cover Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia12. As of February 2006, iTunes 
had sold over 1 billion songs, i.e. more than 80% of worldwide online music sales13.
According to Charlie Mc Creevy, European commissioner for internal market and 
services, “The digital market for music was worth USD 330 millions in 2004 – estimates 
expect it to double in 2005. Analysts predict that digital sales could reach 25% of record 
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pressplay. 
10 URS GASSER, ITUNES: HOW COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL 
MEDIA - A CASE STUDY 9 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556802.
11 GASSER, supra note 10, at 11, however points out that one can only burn the same exact playlist seven times in 
order to prevent mass-production of copies for illicit sales.
12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITunes_Music_Store. 
13 Id. For a worldwide listing of the online music stores, see http://www.pro-music.org/musiconline.htm. 
5company revenues in five years. 50 million portable music players were sold in 2004, 
including 10 million iPods”14.
Both the p2p phenomenon and the development of online music stores raise important 
questions as to the management of the online exploitation of copyrighted works. This 
exploitation involves several layers of stakeholders. The first layer consists of the right 
holders, and they shall be defined more accurately later on when I give a general overview of 
the music industry; the second is the users, i.e., the ones who are supposed to request the 
authorization to exploit the copyrighted works, in our case the websites’ owners; the third 
layer is the computing industry, which designs the software facilitating the widespread 
dissemination and/or exchange of copyrighted works on the Internet as well as the technical 
protecting devices; the fourth layer is composed of the consumers, who use the Internet to 
play the copyrighted works, and the final layer consists of the collective societies, who 
manage the exploitation of these works on behalf of the right holders.At first glance, a global 
study on the management of copyrighted works involving all the stakeholders could appear to
be the most relevant. Such a study would however suffer several shortcomings. First, all these 
layers involve different categories of players. For instance, users develop their activities based 
upon different business models: iTunes, an online music store, differs from KaZaa, a p2p 
system, which differs in turn from web-broadcasters, i.e., online radio or television stations. 
One may thus doubt the validity of any selected sample. Besides, a study taking all the 
stakeholders into account might be diluted by trying to represent too many divergent opinions. 
A focus on collective societies makes sense for several reasons. First, scholars have yet to 
14 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/rec_crm_en.pdf.
6address the issue of copyright management from the standpoint of collective societies. True, 
several scholars have discussed copyright management on the Internet. However, most 
publications have been and are focused on the enactment and implementation of legal 
provisions related to digital rights management (DRM) as a consequence of the adoption of 
the Internet Treaties15. Strangely enough, the question of how collective societies operate in 
the digital environment remain absent from any debate among legal scholars. No empirical 
research has ever been conducted in this area. In the very first sentence of his seminal book on 
collective administration of copyrights, David Sinacore-Guinn writes: “Despite the obvious 
importance of collective rights administration and organizations, publications on the legal 
aspects of the activities of collective societies and the concepts that govern them are rare”16. I 
would add that publications on collective societies in the digital environment are almost 
nonexistent. The time has come to fill that void. Secondly, we shall see that, from a 
methodological point of view, collective societies are structured upon a similar model 
everywhere around the world17. All of them are facing the same problems on the Internet. To 
find a representative sample is thus much easier.
The core of this paper is based upon several interviews that were conducted between 
December 2005 and January 2006 with executives of the following collective societies: the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music Inc. 
15
 See for instance : in Switzerland : Jacques de Werra, The Legal System of Technological Protection Measures 
under the WIPO Treaties, the DMCA, the European Union Directives and other National Legislations (Japan, 
Australia), 189 RIDA 66 (2001); in the US: Jane Ginsburg, News from the US: Development in US Copyright 
Since the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Part I, 196 RIDA 127 (2003) and Part II, 197 RIDA 77 (2003); in 
Belgium: SÉVERINE DUSSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L’UNIVERS NUMÉRIQUE –
DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS À LA LUMIÈRE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES ŒUVRES (2005).
16 DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS xli 
(1993).
17
 See infra Part II: Did you say collective societies ?
7(BMI), die Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), la Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de 
Musique (SACEM), la Société Suisse pour les droits des auteurs d’oeuvres musicales
(SUISA), la Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) as well as the 
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC)18. This 
selection is based upon the following criteria: The United States, Europe and Japan are the 
primary consumers of musical works19, and the paper focuses on countries having a similar 
level of copyright protection. Considering recent developments within the European Union20, 
it also makes sense to take into consideration not only large European collective societies 
such as GEMA and SACEM, but also small ones such as SUISA and SABAM.
II. DID YOU SAY COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES?
A. Introduction
1847. The reign of Louis-Philippe was coming to an end. Charles Baudelaire had 
published his first translations of Edgar Allan Poe’s works and Honoré de Balzac was about 
to finish his Comédie Humaine. The music industry was still far from being an “industry”. 
This was still a time when technology played a much lesser role, and when Giuseppe Verdi 
18 All interviews but for JASRAC were conducted face-to-face. An interview questionnaire was sent to 
JASRAC.
19
 According to data collected by Jürgen Meier and Armin Vogel, The Music Industry in the 21st Century –
Facing the Digital Challenge 18 (2002), at http://www.screendigest.com/reports/mi2104/NSMH-
5SDK6M/sample.pdf, market shares regarding music consumption in the world were divided as follows in 2002: 
38.8% for the United States, 29.8% for the European Union and Switzerland (with 6.6% for Germany and 4.6% 
for France) and 17.7% for Japan. By comparison, China’s market share for music consumption only amounted to 
0.5% (lower than the 0.7% allocated to Switzerland for instance) despite 30.3% of worldwide population.
20 See infra Part IV A 1: How Do Performing Rights Societies Operate in the Digital Environment – Authorized 
Distribution Channels: Online Music Stores – From the Sydney Agreement to the EU Recommendation.
8could see his works performed publicly in Teatro alla Scala. The same applied to Ernest 
Bourget, whose fame could not be compared to that of Verdi but  who, still, also owned 
copyrights in his works. On one evening in March 1847, Ernest Bourget was sitting at the 
terrasse of the café-théâtre “Les Ambassadeurs” on the Champs-Elysées and enjoying a glass 
of eau sucrée. While drinking, Ernest Bourget heard the performance of his composition “Les 
Bluettes” in the café. Considering that he had no reason to allow the performance of his work
without compensation, he offered to authorize the owner of the café to perform his work in 
return for his drink. The owner refused, Ernest Bourget sued him in front of the Tribunal de 
Commerce de la Seine and won the case21. The story would have remained an anecdote if it 
had not led to the creation in 1851 of the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de 
Musique, better known as SACEM22, whose main mission is to monitor the works of its 
members and distribute the amounts received from the exploitation of these works among 
these members. The concept of performing rights society was born23. 
Performing right societies quickly spread around Europe: The Societa Italiana degli 
Autori ed Editori (SIAE) was created in 1882, the Anstalt für musikalisches Aufführungsrecht
in Germany in 190324. In 1911, SACEM created an office in the United States in an attempt to 
enlist American Composers. Americans however had no desire to enroll in a French society 
and, on a rainy October night in 1913, nine composers and music publishers led by Nathan 
21
 This story is depicted by several authors. See for instance: David Peeperkorn, Collecting for “Bluettes”, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 
11 et seq. (1989); MIHALY FICSOR, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS (2003), at
19 § 28.
22 http://www.SACEM.fr. 
23
 Actually, the SACEM was not the first collective society in history. In 1791, Beaumarchais had founded the 
Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD) to represent the interests of dramatic authors and 
composers to theater owners with respect to performances of their works. In 1837, Honoré de Balzac, Alexandre 
Dumas, Georges Sand and Victor Hugo had created the Société des Gens de Lettres de France (SGDL). The 
latter one however protects the interests of writers without being a collective society stricto sensu.
24 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 84.
9Burkan created the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, better known as 
ASCAP25. 
After performing right societies were flourishing in many countries26, it became clear 
that organization on an international basis was required. One way to do it could have been to 
open foreign offices with foreign jurisdictions, as SACEM had tried to do in 1911 in the 
United States. However, such a solution would have required each user to request a license 
from each foreign office to be able to perform that office’s repertoire; it thus had significant 
transaction cost and was fairly unpopular among authors27. A preferred approach that quickly 
developed and is still being used was for collective societies to enter into reciprocal 
representation agreements with each other28. According to these agreements, each society 
agrees to represent the interests of the other within its respective territory; instead of 
monitoring its sole repertoire, each collective society thus administers a worldwide repertoire 
on its territory. 
In order to coordinate their work, 18 performing rights societies founded the 
International Confederation of Authors and Composers (CISAC) in 192629, whose model 
contract has been used since its adoption in 1936 for most if not all reciprocal agreements 
concluded among the performing rights societies30. Eighty years after its creation, CISAC 
25 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 54-55 (rev. ed. 2003); I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in 
Music and Performing Rights Organizations, Revisited, 50 J. COPR. SOC’Y 355, 376 et seq. (2003).
26 See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 85.
27 ULRICH UCHTENHAGEN, LA GESTION COLLECTIVE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR DANS LA VIE MUSICALE (2005), at 
125 § 672.
28 See on these agreements : SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 645 et seq.
29 http://www.cisac.org/web/Content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-US-
HISTORY&Lang2=EN. See for more information on CISAC: UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 110 et seq., § 
582 et seq.
30 UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 113 et seq. § 597 et seq.; FICSOR, supra note 21, at 42 § 87.
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now has 210 members from over 109 countries31. In December 1990, European collective 
societies decided that time had come for them to create a group that would be a link between 
them and the European institutions. That group is called the European Grouping of Societies 
of Authors and Composers (GESAC) and currently counts 34 of the largest author’s societies 
in the European Union, Norway and Switzerland, representing nearly 500’000 authors, not 
only in the area of music, but also graphic and plastic arts, literary, dramatic and audiovisual 
works32.
Performing rights societies have significant economic power. ASCAP currently counts
over 230,000 U.S. composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music publishers as affiliates. 
Through agreements with affiliated international societies, it also represents hundreds of 
thousands of music creators worldwide33. ASCAP revenues for 2005 amounted to USD 749
millions34. Collective societies worldwide collected over USD 5 billions in 2003, with 90% of 
these revenues coming from the music industry35.
B. Nature and membership
According to Sinacore-Guinn, “collective societies” can be defined as “a legally 
cognizable entity whose objectives are to represent the economic and moral interests of 
creative rights owners and whose function is to administer, using transactional techniques of a 
greater or lesser degree of collectivization, the economic and moral rights of a significant 
31 http://www.cisac.org/web/Content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-US-
MEMBER. 
32 http://www.gesac.org/eng/gesac/default.htm. 
33 http://www.ASCAP.com/about/. 
34 http://www.ascap.com/press/2006/031306_financial.html.
35 http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=A-US-CISAC. 
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proportion of a nation’s creative rights owners in their works”36. Performing rights societies 
are just one type of copyright collective societies and specifically monitor the public 
performances of musical works.
With the exception of the United States, collective societies are all regulated by both 
provisions in national legislation37 and by their bylaws. While the US Copyright Act does not 
specifically discuss performing rights societies, they operate under consent decrees, for 
reasons that shall be explained below. Due to the fact that performing rights societies owe 
their origins to the actions of individual authors in major industrial nations, they are all private 
organizations owned and controlled by their affiliated right owners38; for instance, the board 
of directors of ASCAP is composed of 24 directors, 12 of whom are writer members and 12 
of whom are publisher members39.  The legal status of these societies may vary however; 
while ASCAP, JASRAC and GEMA are non-profit associations, BMI, SACEM and SUISA 
are corporate entities. 
With the exception once again of the United States, where three performing rights 
societies coexist, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC40, most collective societies operate as de facto or 
de jure41 monopolies within their territory42. This monopolistic situation has at least three 
36 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 10 and 194.
37
 Art. 65-78 of the Belgium Copyright Act, as well as the Royal Decree of April, 6, 1995; Art. L 321-1 to L 
321-13 of the French Copyright Act; The German Copyright Administration Law; The Japanese Law on 
Intermediary Business Concerning Copyright;  Art. 40-60 of the Swiss Copyright Act.
38 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 40 § 79 et seq., 136 § 365 et seq.; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 16, who 
however mentions that collective societies are public entities in the developing countries. See for instance the 
Algerian Office national des droits d’auteur et des droits voisins (ONDA), http://www.onda.dz/onda.asp. 
39
 Art. IV Section 1 of the Articles of Association of ASCAP.
40
 For a brief overview of each of these societies, see: James Kendrick, A Short History of Collective Licensing –
Musical Compositions – The American Experience, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT 
LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 30 et seq. (2002); DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, 
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONS 532 et seq. (1993).
41
 Such is the case for instance of Switzerland, where Art. 42.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act provides that 
“authorization shall be granted as a rule to one society only for each category of works and to one society for 
neighboring rights”.
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major advantages43: first, it enables collective societies to grow large enough to effectively 
represent their members on a national scale and defend their interests; second, it allows the 
appropriate infrastructure to effectively monitor the exploitation of members’ works 
throughout the country; and third, users can get a license from a single society rather than 
having to ask for permission from several entities. Broad support was expressed in favor of 
the dominant if not exclusive position of collective societies during the hearing related to 
collective management that took place in Brussels in November 200044.
However, monopolistic or dominant positions also raise some concerns. One may 
wonder whether collective societies are allowed to refuse applicants. As a matter of principle, 
applicants have to fulfill the requirements contained in the bylaws, i.e., for performing rights 
societies, to be an author, composer or publisher. May nationality requirements be used to 
exclude prospective members? The answer depends upon the countries. Before 1971, GEMA 
used to have bylaws that prohibited the affiliation of non-German citizens. In a decision 
rendered on June 2, 197145, the European Court of Justice ruled that those bylaws were 
infringing article 86 of the EC Treaty by denying nationals of other Member States the right 
to join GEMA. In addition, the Court ruled that Member States had to allow affiliates to limit 
the grant of their rights to certain territories as well as entrust the management of their rights 
42 Robert du Bois, Principles of tariffs and distribution; some remarks on the most important activities of 
authors’ rights societies, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE 
SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 68, 71 (1989); SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 16; UCHTENHAGEN, supra 
note 27, at 19-20, § 57 et seq.; Herman Cohen Jehoram, The Future of Copyright Collecting Societies, 3 E.I.P.R. 
134, 135 (2001).
43 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 222 et seq., and FICSOR, supra note 21, at 135 § 362 share the same view.
44 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/management/hearing-collective-mgmt_en.htm. See also 
remarks made by Mihaly Ficsor and Gerhard Pfennig in response to Axel aus der Mühlen, in WIPO 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE EXERCISE AND MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS IN 
THE FACE OF THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 91-92 (1998).
45 GEMA I, decision of June 20, 1971, OJ L 134/15. See Jan Corbet, Author’s societies in Europe, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
22, 26 (1989).
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in different territories to different societies. Similarly, affiliates had to have the right to limit 
the grant of their rights to certain categories of rights, and to hand over the administration of 
other categories of rights to other societies. This ruling was confirmed three years later in BRT 
v. SABAM and Fonior, in which the European Court of Justice ruled that collective societies 
had to ensure a balance in their internal rules between “the requirements of maximum 
freedom for authors, composers, and publishers to dispose of their works and that of the 
effective management of their rights”46. 
While very few authors have actually taken advantage of the new provisions to join 
different societies for different categories of rights and/or territories47, the situation remains 
that any EU author is entitled to join any EU collective society due to the principle of free 
movement of persons. However, this principle does not apply in other countries, which still 
require a certain relation with their country as a precondition: SUISA for instance requests its 
members to demonstrate a close relation with Switzerland, either through citizenship, 
residence or in some other way48; going further, JASRAC requests any member to be a 
resident of Japan and to have the center of his/her activities in Japan49.
Considering their dominant position, collective societies have to operate based upon 
the principle of fair and equitable treatment; in other words, they have no right to treat 
applicants placed in similar positions in a different way50. Once an applicant fulfills the 
requirements stated in the bylaws, it is almost impossible for a collective society to refuse an 
46
 Case 127/73, [1974] ECR 313.
47 Corbet, supra note 45, at 26.
48 Art. 5.1 of the Statutes of SUISA (http://www.SUISA.ch/home_f.htm). 
49 http://www.JASRAC.or.jp/ejhp/membership/index.html. 
50 See SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 341-342. Art. 45.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act expressly provides 
that “they [the collecting societies] shall administer the rights in accordance with fixed rules and with the 
requirements of equal treatment”.
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application51. This being said, the issue is only theoretical, because in practice, collective 
societies are eager to have as many members as possible to increase their repertoire.
Authors, composers and publishers never have an obligation to adhere to a collective 
society, even though affiliation will often be unavoidable with respect to those rights that by 
nature or statute cannot be administered individually52. This is one of the main issues 
addressed by the consent decrees under which both ASCAP and BMI operate. To understand 
how these decrees were enacted, one has to go back to the 1940s. As radio had become more 
and more successful in the 1930s, ASCAP, then the sole performing right society in the 
United States, had expressed its will to increase its license fees so as to collect more
substantial royalties. Broadcasters claimed that ASCAP was abusing its monopolistic 
position. Since ASCAP licenses were to expire on December, 31, 1940, broadcasters decided 
to fight against the society on its own territory, and to create a new performing rights society 
on their own: that society was Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). Meanwhile, the Justice 
Department had filed an antitrust suit against ASCAP and was willing to file a new one 
against both ASCAP and BMI in 1941, alleging eight violations of the Sherman Act. Both 
BMI and ASCAP settled the cases53. The consent decrees are the result of these settlements54. 
51
 On this issue in more detail, see SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 303 et seq.
52 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 289; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 34 § 144; John Morton, Remark in
WIPO INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE EXERCISE AND MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 35 (1998), according to whom “from the 
point of view of musicians, […] it is […] unrealistic to regard the collective management of rights as 
exceptional”, and Gerard Gabella in the same volume, at 37.
53 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 58-60; Kendrick, supra note 40, at 31 and 34; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 
20 § 62.
54
 For ASCAP: United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cases (CCH), 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), amended by 
1950-1951 Trade cases (CCH), 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), amended by 1960 Trade Cases (CCH), 69,912 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), amended by 2001 Civil Action (WCC) 41,1395 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). For BMI: United States v. 
BMI, 1940-1943 Trade Cases (CCH) 56,0966 (E.D. Wis. 1941); 1966 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966). On these consent decrees, see: Alfred Schlesinger, Collecting Societies and United States Anti-Trust Law, 
in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
85 et seq. (1989); Koenigsberg, supra note 26, at 382 et seq.
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In its fourth provision, which points out the voluntarily basis of any collective management, 
the 2001 consent decree enjoins and restrains ASCAP from “limiting, restricting, or 
interfering with the right of any member to issue, directly or through an agent other than a 
performing rights organization, non-exclusive licenses to music users for rights of public 
performance”. In other words, performing rights can never be assigned on an exclusive basis 
in the United States55. 
The situation differs in Europe, where rights are usually assigned on an exclusive basis 
to the societies. These exclusive assignments have been challenged there as well however. In 
1993, the Irish rock band U2 and their publishers challenged PRS’ rules, according to which 
their live performance right had to be assigned on an exclusive basis56. According to the band, 
they would be better served if they were able to administer this right on their own for at least 
two reasons: self-administration would obviate the need to pay any administrative and social 
deductions57, and they would get paid for their performances much faster than the three year 
period they faced at PRS. PRS refused to forego the assignment, believing that self-
administration was not only impossible but contrary to the band’s interests. Confronted with
this refusal, U2 brought an action before the High Court of Justice for abuse of dominant 
position by PRS in February 1994. The proceedings were delayed due to an investigation that 
55 Andre Schmidt, Contracts and Powers of Representation of Collecting Societies, in INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 54, 57-58 (1989); 
Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 379.
56
 PRS is an acronym for the UK performing rights society. The following explanations are based upon the two 
following contributions: Crispin Evans & Nathalie Larrieu, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) –
Performing Rights: The Licensor Experience – Live Performances: the PRS Experience, in INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 61 et seq.
(2002); Euan Lawson, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) – Performing Rights: The Licensee 
Experience – Live Performances: Collecting Societies and the Public Performance Right, in INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 89, 92 et 
seq. (2002).
57
 As to these deductions, see infra Part II D: Did you Say Collective Societies - Accounting and distributing 
royalties.
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began on October 13, 1994 under the auspices of the British Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. In February 1996, the Commission determined that the exclusive assignment 
was not mandated by the members’ interests and was in violation of GEMA and BRT 
mentioned previously. Based upon this outcome, the parties finally settled. As a result, PRS 
amended its statutes and introduced a general scheme under which it would grant each 
member a license for live performances upon request wherever and whenever the 
performance takes place; in addition, PRS engaged itself to pay the royalties directly to the 
publishers and writers within 30 days of the date of the concert. On August 6, 2002, the 
European Commission confirmed the opinion of the British Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission in Banghalter, and held that a mandatory assignment of all the author’s rights, 
including as to their online exploitation, would amount to an abuse of dominant position 
within the meaning of article 82(a) of the E.C. Treaty58. Therefore, while nobody has ever 
contested the right for members to leave a society and adhere to another one59, U2 and 
Banghalter made it clear that authors also have the right not to adhere to any performing right 
society at all.
Considering the monopolistic or at least dominant position occupied by European 
performing rights societies, antitrust analysis plays a significant role in the way these societies 
perform their duties. Antitrust suits against performing rights societies have been filed in both 
58 Banghalter and Homem Christo v. SACEM, decision of August 6, 2002, case COMP/C2/37.219, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37219/fr.pdf. 
59
 According to UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 48 § 226, SUISA, which administers the worldwide register of 
composers, authors and editors technically called CAE/IPI (standing for “Compositeurs, Auteurs, 
Editeurs”/Interested Party Information), would transfer over 100’000 affiliations from one society to another 
each year.
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Europe60 and the United States61. In most countries, the governmental control is not limited to 
judicial supervision however. Additional regulation usually comes from two sources: first, the 
control of copyright royalty tribunals over rate schedules, such as in Germany, Switzerland or 
the United States62. While these tribunals only intervene when stakeholders cannot reach an 
agreement in Germany and in the United States, it always has to approve the rate schedules in 
in Switzerland; in practice, such approval is automatic when stakeholders have reached a 
consensus. Neither Belgium nor Japanese laws require any governmental approval of the 
rates, but both countries nevertheless communicate their rates to public entities: to the 
Ministry of Economical Affairs in Belgium63, and to the Agency for Cultural Affairs in
Japan64.  Secondly, in all countries under scrutiny but the United States, the operations of 
performing rights societies are supervised by a public entity65.
After having discussed the nature and legal framework under which performing rights 
societies operate, we now turn more specifically to their duties.
60 See Jean-Francois Bellis, Collecting societies and EEC law, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 78 et seq. (1989). For instance: BRT 
v. SABAM and Fonior, Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 313; Greenwich Films v. SACEM, Case 22/79, [1979] ECR 
3275; GVL v. Commission, Case 7/82, [1983] ECR 483; Musik Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, Case 55/88, [1981] 
ECR 147.
61 CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F.Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev’d, 562 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1977), rev’d, BMI v. CBS, 441 
U.S. 1 (1979); BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 758 (D.Del 1981), aff’d mem., 691 F.2d (3d Cir. 1982); 
ASCAP v. Showtime, 912 F.2d 563 (2nd Cir. 1990); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. BMI, 772 F.Supp. 614 
(D.D.C. 1991).
62
 Art. 14 of the German Copyright Administration Law; Art. 46.3 of the Swiss Copyright Act; § 801 of the US 
Copyright Act. See as to these tribunals: SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 428 et seq.
63 Interview with SABAM (December, 22, 2005).
64 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 431.
65
 These entities can vary: the Patent Office in Germany (Art. 18 of the German Copyright Administration Law); 
the Federal Institute of Intellectual Property in Switzerland (Art. 52 of the Swiss Copyright Act); the Ministry of 
Justice in Belgium (Art. 76 of the Belgium Copyright Act); the Ministry of Culture and a special Commission in 
France (Art. L 321-3, L 321-9, L 321-12 and L 321-13 of the French Copyright Act). See on this control: du 
Bois, supra note 59, at 71-72; Nanette Rigg, A Short History of Collective Licensing – Musical Compositions –
The European Perspective : Collective Management of Rights in Europe From 1777 to 2002. Why is it 
necessary ?, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 18, 24-25 (2002); FICSOR, supra note 21, at 144 et seq. § 395 et seq. ; SINACORE-GUINN, 
supra note 16, at 519 et seq.; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 12-13 §§ 11 et seq.
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C. Granting Licenses
The licenses granted by performing rights societies have one specific feature: they 
cover the whole repertoire monitored by the society, i.e. both its members’ repertoire as well 
as those of its sister societies based upon the executed reciprocal agreements. The delivery of 
a license for some musical works at the exclusion of others is therefore impossible66. Such 
licenses are called “blanket licenses”. In other words, users will be allowed to exploit “any of 
the works in the collective’s repertoire upon payment of a fixed fee, without distinction as to 
the actual works used”67. While this may be at the advantage of most users, others might be 
interested in a couple of works only and thus unwilling to pay for the whole repertoire. Such 
was the case in particular of local television stations in the United States during the 1980s. 
These stations considered blanket licenses to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, and 
therefore brought an antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New-York. The District Court ruled in favor of the local television stations. On appeal, the 
Court reversed and ruled that blanket licenses were not an unreasonable restraint on trade 
where the opportunity to acquire individual rights through program license, direct license, or 
source license was realistically available to the station, as in this case68. In Europe, the French 
66
 Certain countries, in particular the United States, allow the deliverance of  “per program licenses” which, as 
their name indicates, consists of licenses for a particular program only. However, there again, the license covers 
the worldwide repertoire (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 43 § 89; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 388).
67
 du Bois, supra note 42, at 69; Gunnar W.G. Karnell, Collecting societies in music, in INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE SOCIETIES IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS 15, 17 (1989); 
SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 20-21, and at 382 et seq.; Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 375 and 387; 
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 19-20 § 53 et seq.; FICSOR, supra note 21, at 43 § 88.
68 Buffalo Broadcasting Co v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1984).
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Cour de cassation also ruled in 1985 and 1987 that the delivery of blanket licenses by 
SACEM did not amount to an abuse of dominant position69.
The policies and operations of performing rights societies are governed by the 
principal of fair and equal treatment70, meaning they are not allowed to treat similar users in 
similar positions differently. In Tournier, The European Court of Justice made it clear that 
collecting societies may not engage in a concerted action having the effect of systematically 
refusing to grant direct access to their repertoires to users located in foreign territories, a 
possible justification for such a refusal being the impracticality of setting up a monitoring 
system in the foreign territory71. In its article 11.1, the German Copyright Administration Law 
even provides that “collecting societies shall be required to grant exploitation rights or 
authorizations to any person so requesting on equitable terms in respect of the rights they 
administer”. 
To avoid any discrimination, performing right societies will try and negotiate rates 
schedules with diverse categories of users for the different types of exploitations possible72. 
Several criteria are relevant to these negotiations73. First, performing rights societies will try 
to find out whether existing rate schedules can apply to a new channel of distribution, a 
criterion which obviously plays an important role on the Internet; for instance, the rate 
schedules applied to webcasting are the same as the ones for radio broadcasting. When there 
is no similar existing business model on the market, which was the case for music on demand
a few years ago, the societies will try to consider the royalty rates charged by sister societies 
69 SARL Le Xénon v. SACEM, Cass. civ. I, decision of April 16, 1985; Société Générale de la Ferme c. SACEM, 
Cass. civ. I, decision of June 23, 1987.
70 UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 32-33 § 133 et seq., as well as 61-62 § 301 et seq. and 85-86 § 455 et seq.
71 Ministère Public v. Tournier, decision of July 13, 1989, case 395/87, ECR (1989) 2521.
72 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 44 § 90; Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 385.
73 See, in general, du Bois, supra note 42, at 74; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 412 et seq.
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for similar types of licenses in foreign countries74. Considering the global reach of the 
exploitation, especially on the Internet, performing rights societies cannot ignore the rates that 
have been set by their sister societies. Users may not understand why rates would 
significantly differ from one country to another for a similar business model, and societies 
would find it hard to justify such differences. More than that, the European Court of Justice 
expressly ruled in 1989 in Lucazeau that the imposition of significantly higher tariffs than 
those applicable in other Member States would constitute an abuse of dominant position, 
unless the differences are justified by objective and relevant factors75. For these reasons, rates
for music on demand appear to be similar if not identical in most countries76. Second, the 
rates will depend upon the type of exploitation; a user who features music as a primary 
attraction, for instance in a concert hall, will obviously pay more for a musical performing 
rights license than a user who supplies music as background for its customers, such as in a 
restaurant or a hotel; in other words, “a collective will analyze each industry according to how 
it uses the creative work, how it earns its income, and what it can afford”77. Finally, 
performing rights societies will negotiate these rates keeping in mind a traditional rule of 
thumb recommended by CISAC since 195478, according to which the maker of a work 
participates with ten percent of the profits of that work79; this rule is even expressly 
mentioned in article 60.2 of the Swiss Copyright Act80.
74 UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 74 § 387.
75 Lucazeau v. SACEM, decision of July 13, 1989, cases 110/88 and 241/88, ECR (1989) 2811.
76 See infra Part IV A 4: How Do Performing Rights Societies Operate in the Digital Environment – Authorized 
Distribution Channels – Current Practice of Performing Rights Societies.
77 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 414. The performance of music in restaurants and cafés was held to be for 
profit in 1917; see Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 591, 37 S.Ct. 232 (1917) and its depiction by 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 55-56.
78 UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 71 § 367.
79 As to this rule, see : UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 69 et seq., § 354 et seq. One will then have to apply this 
rule depending upon several circumstances. For instance, for public concerts, performing rights societies will 
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Needless to say, numerous rate schedules coexist, covering a wide range of 
performances depending either upon the type of location, such as nightclubs, concerts, 
restaurants, hotels, or the type of media used, such as radio, television, cable, analog or digital 
players, blank tapes, CDs or DVDs, cell phones or the Internet81. For instance, in 2006, 
GEMA counted more than 70 different rate schedules82.
D. Accounting and Distributing Royalties
At regular intervals, the periodicity of which depends upon the licensing terms of each 
collective society83, users will have to complete report forms recording the use they made of 
have to evaluate the amount of music which is copyrighted and the one which belongs to the public domain. 
When protected musical works are performed during a third of a concert, the rate will be of 3.3%. If half the time 
of a radio broadcasting is devoted to the performance of protected musical works, the appropriate rate will 
amount to 5% (i.e. 10% of 50%) of the gross income of the radio broadcaster.
80 Both the Swiss and US Copyright Act try to provide some guidance in the establishment of these rate 
schedules.  Art. 60 of the Swiss Copyright Act reads as follows: “1. When determining compensation, account 
shall be taken of: (a) the proceeds obtained from use of the work, performance, phonogram or videogram or 
broadcast or, subsidiarily, the outlay involved in the use; (b) the nature and quantity of the works, performances, 
phonograms or videograms or broadcasts used; (c) the ratio of protected to unprotected works, performances, 
phonograms or videograms or broadcasts, and other services; 2. Compensation shall normally amount to a 
maximum of 10 percent of the proceeds from or cost of utilization for authors’ rights and a maximum of 3 
percent for neighboring rights; however, it shall be determined in such a way that, subject to economic 
administration, the entitled persons receive equitable remuneration”. Section 801 (b) 1 of the US Copyright Act 
provides that: “[…]. The rates applicable […] shall be calculated to achieve the following objectives: (a) to 
maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (b) to afford the copyright owner a fair return for his 
creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions; (c) to reflect the relative 
roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to 
the relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to 
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication; (d) to minimize any 
disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices”.
81
 ASCAP : http://www.ASCAP.com/licensing/generallicensing.html; BMI: http://www.bmi.com/licensing/; 
GEMA: http://www.GEMA.de/engl/customers/; JASRAC: 
http://www.JASRAC.or.jp/ejhp/provisions/pdf/tariffs02.pdf; SABAM: 
http://www.SABAM.be/website/fr/home.htm; SACEM: 
http://www.SACEM.fr/portailSACEM/jsp/ep/home.do?tabId=2; SUISA: http://www.SUISA.ch/home_f.htm (see 
“utilisateurs”, then “tarifs”).
82 http://www.GEMA.de/engl/customers/schnellsuche.shtml. 
83
 The periodicity of the report forms delivered by users to performing rights societies should not be mistaken 
with the periodicity of the distribution of royalties. To take an example, ASCAP distributes the royalties to the 
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the repertoire. The forms differ depending upon the collective society as well as the type of 
activities carried out84. There is no international standard for reporting requirements which 
can differ for each society and each country. To make sure that users comply with these 
requirements, performing right societies maintain staffs of inspectors to identify potential 
users and audit users’ accounting from time to time85.
Considering the fact that performing rights societies deliver blanket licenses, they will 
receive from users a global amount of money that will have to be allocated as fairly as 
possible to the different rights holders. Before this allocation actually takes place, societies 
will take a certain percentage of royalties to cover their costs86; these costs may vary in a 
range from 10-20% of the collected amount. After having covered their expenses, performing 
rights societies will distribute the remaining royalties among the rights holders. To do this, 
they basically have two options. They can request the users to keep records of all the works 
used in a given period of time; this method is feasible when the amount of works involved is 
limited87. European performing rights societies tend to rely on complete census as much as 
can be. This is not the system chosen in the United States however, where performing rights 
societies consider that it would be prohibitively costly for several types of activities to keep 
track of all the works that have been performed; such a complete census is in particular 
unpopular for mass uses of works, because of the substantial transaction costs of assembling 
writers and publishers 8 times a year (4 times for the domestic distribution and 4 times for the international 
distribution) (http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/distribution.html); SUISA does it 14 times a year. 
84 For examples of report forms, see: ASCAP: http://www.ascap.com/licensing/generalreports.html; BMI: 
http://www.bmi.com/licensing/forms/Hotel%20_report.pdf (regarding public performances in hotels); SABAM: 
http://www.sabam.be/website/fr/012005.htm.
85 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 442-443.
86
 As to these administrative costs and expenses, see SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 448 et seq.; 
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 105 § 558 et seq.
87 For instance, a theatre will have no problem keeping records of all the movies that have been played during a 
year and for how long. According to Ficsor, a complete census generally takes place for concerts, recitals of 
classical music and certain other live concerts and events (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 46 § 97).
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information on those uses88. Thus, as explained by ASCAP, it will conduct a complete count 
of performances in a medium whenever the cost of collecting and processing accurate 
performance information is a low enough percentage of the revenues generated by that 
medium89. As an alternative, US performing rights societies have developed sampling 
methods that are designed to be a statistically accurate representation of performances in a 
medium90. 
Generally speaking, distribution rules are fairly complicated. As an example, the 
German rules cover more than a hundred pages…For obvious reasons, I shall not go into the 
details of these regulations. While these methods may vary from one type of activity to 
another and from one performing rights society to another, they can be summarized as 
follows:
Whether they apply a complete census or sampling method, performing rights 
societies will try to break down their market according to revenue sources. These
classifications may vary from one society to another: while SUISA has identified twelve
primary sources of revenues, such as national public network, private networks, cable 
88 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 444.
89 http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/keepingtrack.html. This is for instance possible in the licensing of
mechanical rights, where the Harry Fox Agency can require the exact number of copies of phonograms sold that 
embody the works.
90
 According to Massarsky, while presenting some advantages, these sampling methods would nevertheless 
suffer four main drawbacks : first of all, it obviously misses all of the performances of a work; secondly, it can 
overcompensate certain performances through the statistical multiplier effect that extrapolates the sample to the 
universal value; thirdly, it can misappropriate the ranking of certain performances, in particular the activity of 
songs that are just below the hit level; finally, certain genres such as Latino or Country create poor proxies under 
the sample method since they should be subdivided into several categories (tropical, Mexican, tejano and pop for 
instance as far as Latino music is concerned) (Barry Massarsky, Collective Licensing Today [non digital media] 
– Performing Rights: The Licensor Experience – Feature Broadcasts: the “Great” Debate Surrounding PRO 
Radio Sampling, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 67, 70-71 [2002]). These concerns are shared by Ficsor, who also points out the fact 
that performing rights societies may influence the distribution of remuneration in favour of certain categories of 
works (FICSOR, supra note 21, at 46 § 98).
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networks, etc.91, GEMA has identified twenty 92. All these revenue sources will allow the 
creation of royalty pools such as television, radio, concert, motion picture or foreign 
income93. The creation of these pools are based upon what ASCAP traditionally refers to as 
the “follow the dollar principle”, according to which the money collected from particular 
source of revenues is paid out to members for performances of their works on television and 
money collected from radio stations is paid out for radio performances94.
Once these royalty pools have been precisely identified, the next step in accounting for 
and distributing royalty income will be to identify the number of times each work has been 
performed in a given pool. To do this, performing rights societies correlate the data obtained 
through their monitoring with their own documentation; this process is known as rendez-vous
and is handled by computers. In practice, “a title match process requires that users report their 
uses via a computer readable data carrier compatible with the computer system owned and 
operated by the collective and formatted in conformity with the collective’s data records. The 
collective will then use a specially designed software to perform the rendez-vous”95.
From then on, one has to make a distinction between the complete census model 
usually referred to by European performing rights societies, and the sampling model used by 
the US societies:
European performing rights societies consider the length of time a musical work has 
been performed as the main criterion to calculate the shares of royalties to be distributed to 
the rights holders. In other words, for performances on radio or television stations for 
91 Art. 4.1 Distribution Rules of SUISA
92
 Art. VIII Ausfürhungsbestimmungen zum Verteilungsplan der GEMA für das Aufführungs- und Senderecht.
93 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 468. These were the pools used in 1991 by the Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN).
94 Kendrick, supra note 40, at 32. See on these pools: UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 93-94 § 502 et seq.
95 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 460; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 91 et seq. § 488 et seq.
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instance, the societies will take into account the length of the broadcasting and the number of 
times the musical work has been performed.
Example96
Let us imagine that a broadcaster pays an annual fee of USD 200’000 for the use of copyrighted works. 
If his report mentions a total of 142’027 works performed for a total lapse of time of 454’486 minutes, 
each minute performed will have a value of USD 0.44 (200’000/454’486). If your work has been 
performed for a total of 17 minutes by this broadcaster, your royalty will amount to USD 7.48.
In most cases, United States performing rights societies will not measure the actual use 
of each musical work within a given pool. Instead, a certain number of credit value will be 
given to each musical work. To weigh these credits, several criteria are used, such as the 
genre of the music and the place where it is played, because “The economic value of a 
featured musical performance is greater to a user than is the value that user might attach to the 
use of music as background for either a commercial or a dramatic program”97. ASCAP’s 
distribution rules are very detailed as to how different types of use are weighed differently98; 
while the duration of the performance is taken into consideration as in Europe99,  section VI 
of ASCAP’s distribution rules make a distinction between musical works performed as 
“theme”, “background music”, “jingle”, “cue music”, “bridge music” or “feature 
96 See UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 95 § 508.
97 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 466.
98
 As to ASCAP sampling method in particular, see: Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 394 et seq.
99 See Art. VII lit. E and F Distribution Rules of ASCAP (Weighing Formula); Art. 53 Distribution Rules of 
SACEM ; Art. 3.2.1 Distribution Rules of SUISA; Art. X to XII Ausfürhungsbestimmungen zum Verteilungsplan 
der GEMA für das Aufführungs- und Senderecht. For a criticism of ASCAP’s subjective value judgment basis 
for valuing different types of music instead of focusing mainly on an objective durational basis as European 
performing rights societies, see Paul Katz, Collective Licensing Today (non digital media) – Performing Rights: 
The Licensor Experience – Background Uses: Collective Licensing of Background Music Today, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE 73, 75 (2002).
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performance”100. The time of the day when the music was performed is also taken into 
account for television programs101. Once a credit value has been assigned to all of the works 
in a given pool, the total number of credits will be divided into the amount of royalties 
collected in this pool to create a monetary value for each credit102.
Example
Let us imagine that, luckily for you, your musical work becomes a “hit”. It is performed nationwide 
several times a day on numerous radio stations, totaling a number of 10’000 performances in three 
months. Let us imagine that the applicable distribution rules consider that the performance of a musical 
work on radio carries 2 credits103. Consequently, your number of credits for the performances of that 
particular work on radio stations will be 20’000 (10’000 x 2). Let us imagine that the total number of 
credits in the radio pool amounts to 1 million. If the global amount of royalties collected from the users 
assigned in this radio pool is of USD 5 million, the monetary value for each credit will be USD 5. Since 
you have 20’000 credits in the radio pool, you are entitled to recover USD 100’000 from that pool (i.e. 
20’000 x 5).
The truth is that, whether in Europe or in the United States, you will never recover this 
global amount. First of all, as mentioned previously, performing rights societies will deduct a 
certain percentage of the collected royalties to cover their administrative costs and expenses. 
Secondly, collective societies play an important role in the areas of social, educational and 
cultural activities, especially in Europe. These societies are indeed concerned with the 
100 http://www.ascap.com/reference/drd_rev060705.pdf. 
101 Art. VII lit. D Distribution Rules of ASCAP.
102 du Bois, supra note 42, at 76; SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 468.
103 The example is hypothetical and no distinction is made here between national or local radio stations or the 
time of the day when the work is performed, which might in reality be weighed differently depending upon the 
applicable rules.
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protection of their domestic repertoire and cultural diversity. To protect and encourage their 
own members, performing rights societies have thus developed and implemented pension and 
welfare plans that are subsidized thanks to a deduction upon the amount of royalties 
collected104. While this social deduction may seem justified, it is fairly controversial in the 
international arena. One of the principal problems is that funds are taken from the total 
amount of royalties collected, including foreign owners who usually generate far more money 
than domestic members in Europe; yet, domestic affiliates will ultimately be the only ones to 
enjoy the benefits of these funds, at the exclusion of foreign authors who have to suffer this 
deduction from their income without any compensation in return105. Thus, as strange as it may 
seem, while the need for financial support from European performing rights societies is partly 
due to the predominance of the US repertoire106, the fund itself happens to be mainly funded 
thanks to the exploitation of this foreign repertoire. As a compromise, the CISAC Model 
Contract allows each society to deduct up to ten percent of the sums that would otherwise be 
payable to a foreign collective for use in social, cultural and educational programs107. This 
deduction did not remain unchallenged; in 1994, the British Academy of Songwriters, 
104
 On these issues, see du Bois, supra note 42, at 75; Rigg, supra note 65, at 25-26; SINACORE-GUINN, supra
note 16, at 477 et seq.; Peter Lerche, Rechtsfragen der Verwirklichung kultureller und sozialer Aufgaben bei der 
kollektiven Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten, insbesondere im Blick auf den sogen. 10%-Abzug der GEMA, in
GEMA Jahrbuch 1997/1998, available at 
http://www.gema.de/kommunikation/jahrbuch/jahr_97_98/feature/teilc.shtml#iii4b, who considers that such a 
deduction does not infringe the principle of national treatment, first of all because this principle cannot be 
opposed to performing rights societies as private entities, secondly because this deduction is not related to the 
exercise of an exclusive right that would be covered by the TRIPS Agreement or the Berne Convention; 
UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 33 § 139 et seq., as well as 129 et seq., § 688 et seq.; FICSOR, supra note 21, at 
47 § 99; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 42, at 137; André Chabeau, Remark in WIPO INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON 
THE EXERCISE AND MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF THE 
CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 110 (1998).
105 SINACORE-GUINN, supra note 16, at 39 and 641.
106 Corbet, supra note 45, at 25, indeed writes: “The more widespread domination of the international repertoire 
has dangerous implications for both regional and local culture and even threatens its very existence. The 
societies have therefore realised that they must move away from their cold managerial role and involve 
themselves in safeguarding their cultural heritage”.
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 Art. 8 II CISAC Model Contract of Reciprocal Representation between Public Performing Rights Societies.
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Composers and Authors, joined by PRS in 1996, complained that GEMA’s deductions from 
non-German repertoire was in breach of European antitrust legislation as the deductions 
discriminated against non-German authors108. PRS however never brought its complaint into 
Court109 and, today, most if not all collective societies still deduct close to ten percent of the 
collected royalties for social purposes110.
Example:
Let us go back to our previous example and imagine that the collective society deducts 10% of the 
collected royalties to cover its administrative costs and expenses, plus 10% for its social funds. The 
allocation among the right holders will take place upon the remaining amount, i.e. USD 80’000.
This does still not mean that you will be entitled to recover the entire USD 80’000. 
One has to find out how many people have rights upon the musical works performed. In most 
cases, a musical composition involves at least three categories of right holders: a composer, a
music arranger and a lyricist. The three will be entitled to receive a certain share of the 
royalties. Statutory rules regulating the distribution among rights holders are exceptional. 
Such an example can be found at § 114 (g) of the US Copyright Act, which however deals 
with sound recordings at the exclusion of musical works; according to this provision, 45% of 
the money paid by noninteractive webcasters for the right to broadcast sound recordings over 
the Internet must be paid to featured artists, 2.5% to nonfeatured musicians, 2.5% to 
nonfeatured vocalists and the remaining 50% to the companies holding the sound-recording 
108 Rigg, supra note 65, at 26.
109 Information provided by GEMA.
110
 Art. XVII Section 1 lit. b Articles of Association of ASCAP; § 1.4 lit. a Distribution Rules of GEMA; Art. 33 
Statutes of SACEM; Art. 8.3.6 Statutes of SUISA; 
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copyrights111. In most cases, unless you have an agreement stipulating the way the 
distribution should be made among yourselves regarding your musical work, and such 
agreements are allowed - which is not the case in all countries - the distribution rules of the 
concerned performing rights society will apply. In practice, rights holders usually voluntarily 
submit themselves to the default distribution rules112. Since each performing rights society is 
free to adopt its own distribution rules113, these rules will vary depending upon the type of use 
and the concerned society114. If we refer to our example and admit, hypothetically, that the 
amount has to be shared equally with your arranger and lyricist, which is the default rule of 
SACEM distribution scheme, you will be entitled to receive USD 26’666. Once you get your 
money you will still have to share it with your publisher, in accordance with the agreement 
you have with him.
Now that the principles governing the performance of collecting societies have been 
presented, time has come to wonder how these societies try to reconcile their territorial 
structure with the needs of an online environment without any border.
III. HOW DO PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES OPERATE IN THE DIGITAL 
ENVIRONMENT?
A. Authorized Distribution Channels: Online Music Stores
111
 According to WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 185 (2004), such statutory rules would also be 
found in the Greek legislation.
112
 According to SUISA, its distribution rules apply in 95% of the cases. Same opinion: UCHTENHAGEN, supra 
note 27, at 31 § 119. 
113
 Art. 7 II CISAC Model Contract.
114 See § 4 Distribution Rules of Gema (default rule: 7/12 composer, 1/12 arranger; 4/12 lyricist) ; Art. 9 Statutes 
of SACEM and Art. 54 Distribution Rules of SACEM (default rule: 1/3 to each one); Art. 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 
Distribution Rules of SUISA. 
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1. From the Sydney Agreement to the EU Recommendation
Collective societies have been organized on a territorial basis since their inception, 
meaning that users115 have to acquire a separate license in each country where works will be 
performed. As discussed previously, cooperation occurs via reciprocal agreements that allow 
performing rights societies to monitor a worldwide repertoire in their territory116. This model 
was a viable solution in the analog era, but is outdated now that cross-border trading of 
copyrighted works has become the rule. The need to adapt existing structures to the 
specificities of the digital environment is particularly felt in the European Union, where users 
may have to seek permission from 25 different performing rights societies. In contrast, users 
in the United States only need licenses from ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. As stated by Charlie 
McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, “Europe’s model of 
copyright clearance belongs more to the nineteenth century than to the 21st. Once upon a time 
it may have made sense for the member state to be the basic unit of division. The internet 
overturns that premise”117. For this reason, we shall focus our attention on European 
performing rights societies and refer to Japan and the United States for a comparative 
perspective.
This European focus does not mean that US performing rights societies do not feel 
constrained by their structures. ASCAP, BMI and the Harry Fox Agency actually tried to 
115
 “Users” are defined as entities which have to require a license to exploit copyrighted works.
116 See supra Part II A: Did you Say Collective Societies – Introduction.
117
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/588&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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request an antitrust exemption for a “uni-license proposal” in 2005. This proposal would have 
led to the creation of an agency to deliver one license to digital users for performing and 
mechanical rights regarding musical works in the United States. The money collected would 
have been divided amongst the societies and then distributed to their respective members. 
Unfortunately, the stakeholders could not reach agreement about the applicable rate, because 
the societies felt that users’ demands were “ludicrous”. As a result, multiple licenses granted 
by multiple societies remains the model in the United States.
In spite of Mr McCreevy’s words, Internet Age is not the first time that European 
collective societies have been confronted with cross-border trading in copyrighted works. A 
centralization trend already exists in the field of phonogram production; since large 
phonogram manufacturers are concentrating their production in a few countries, they are 
given “central licenses” by the society of the country where the production or distribution of 
these copies takes place118. This is made possible thanks to negotiations among the different 
societies responsible for the granting of mechanical licenses.
The advent of direct broadcasting satellites in the 1980s also allowed transmission of 
copyrighted programs to several countries. To deal with these cross-border activities before 
the enactment of the E.C. Cable and Satellite Directive in 1993119, CISAC adopted in 1987 an 
addendum to its model contract concerning direct broadcasting satellites, usually referred to 
118 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 124 § 334.
119 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248/15, 
October 6, 1993, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31993L008
3&model=guichett. The Sydney Agreement is however wider in its scope as it is not limited to the European 
Union.
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as the Sydney Agreement120. According to this Agreement, licenses to broadcast the programs 
are delivered by the society of the originating country. If the broadcasts are communicated to 
several countries, the collective societies of the concerned countries have two alternatives: 
either agree that the license granted by the originating country is valid for all countries, or 
require that extraterritorial validity is subject to their approval, and then define the conditions 
under which such cross-border authorizations might be delivered for their respective country.
The Sydney Agreement was used as a model by the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) for the “Simulcast” Agreement in 2002121. The “Simulcast” 
Agreement intends to facilitate the grant of international licenses to radio and TV 
broadcasters to engage in simulcasting122. Given that simulcasting on the Internet involves the 
simultaneous transmission of a signal to several countries, a multi-license model seemed 
appropriate. The parties to the Agreement thus developed a “one stop shopping” license 
scheme, according to which simulcasters located in the European Economic Area (EEA) can 
obtain a multi-territorial license from any collective society in the EEA which is party to the 
Agreement, and then simulcast into the signatories’ territories123. 
According to Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty, concerted practices among undertakings 
which may affect trade between Member States are however prohibited. Since collective 
120 See FICSOR, supra note 21, at 111 et seq. § 305 et seq.
121
 Simulcasting, as defined by the parties to the agreement, is the simultaneous transmission by radio and TV 
stations via the Internet of sound recordings included in their broadcasts of radio and/or TV signals.
122 Commission Decision of October 8, 2002 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/C2/38.014 – IFPI “Simulcasting”), OJ L 107/59, April 30, 
2003.
123
 It is worth noting that Article 3.1 of the first version of the Agreement stated that the license had to be granted 
by the collective society of the country of origin, i.e., the one where the signal originated from. On June 21, 
2002, however, the IFPI provided the Commission with an amended version of the Reciprocal Agreement, 
according to which broadcasters whose signals originated in the EEA could approach any collecting society in 
the EEA that was a party to the Agreement. The freedom to select the society is a key element for the European 
Commission as proved by the proceedings related to the Santiago Agreement described below.
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societies are undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty due to their 
monopolistic position, the Simulcast Agreement was considered a concerted practice. 
However, Art. 81 (3) of the E.C. Treaty permits exemptions where the agreement contributes 
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Parties to the
Simulcast Agreement requested such an exemption from the European Commission. The 
Commission decided that the Agreement, which gave rise to a new product, i.e., a multi-
territorial simulcasting license, was responding to a need in the digital environment and was 
thus justified124. While granting the exemption, the Commission nevertheless required 
collective societies to disclose separately the amount charged to users for the copyright 
royalty on one side, and for the administration fee on the other125. Implicitly, the Commission 
believed that by turning the traditional single license model into a multi-territorial one, users 
were to be able to choose among several collective societies that competed on cost and 
efficiency. The Simulcast decision proves that, since 2002, the desire to enhance competition 
among collective societies is a major priority in the European Commission’s regulation of 
copyright management.
Due to different goals among CISAC’s members, performing rights societies did not 
immediately reach an agreement similar to the Sydney Agreement to deal with the online 
exploitation of musical works. However, in 2000, five societies (BMI, BUMA (Netherlands), 
GEMA, PRS and SACEM) adopted an Agreement during CISAC Congress at Santiago de 
124 OJ L 107/74, § 84-88.
125
 OJ L 107/76-77, § 99 et seq. For an analysis of the decision, see Dorothea Senn, Competition Law Aspects of 
Digital and Collective Rights Management Systems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF 
COLLECTING SOCIETIES? 123, 129 et seq.  (Christoph Beat Graber et al. ed., 2005).
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Chile, known as the Santiago Agreement126. According to the Agreement, users were allowed 
to get a multi-territorial license from the performing rights society in their country of 
economic residence, i.e., the country of their residence from which they conduct their 
activities. Over forty additional societies quickly joined the Santiago Agreement, and in 
September 2001, at its congress in Barcelona, BIEM’s affiliates adopted an identical 
Agreement known as the “Barcelona Agreement” to deal with mechanical reproduction rights. 
These agreements received unanimous support from performing rights societies, not 
only in Europe, but also in Japan and in the United States. While the Santiago and Barcelona 
Agreements were following the trend, initiated by the Simulcast Agreement, to allow multi-
territorial licenses, they contained one main difference that would ultimately lead to their 
demise: unlike the Simulcast Agreement, users could not acquire a license from any 
performing rights society but had to seek permission from the society in their country of 
economic residence. In other words, enhanced competition among collective societies, as 
envisioned in the Simulcast Agreement, could not be achieved in the Santiago and Barcelona 
Agreements because users were unable to choose their society. For this reason, on May 17, 
2001, the Commission published a Notice on these Agreements and invited interested third 
parties to submit observations127. On the basis of the comments received, the Commission 
issued a Statement of Objections on April 29, 2004. In this Statement, the Commission ruled 
126 For more details on the Santiago Agreement, see: FICSOR, supra note 21, at 114 et seq. § 311 et seq.; Lucie 
Guibault, A quand l’octroi de licences transfrontières pour l’utilisation de droits d’auteur et de droits voisins en 
Europe, 8 et seq., at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001400/140025f.pdf; Senn, supra note 125, at 134-
135.
127
 Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Cases COMP/C2/39152 
– BUMA and COMP/C2/39151 SABAM (Santiago Agreement – COMP/C2/38126), OJ C 145/2, May 17, 2001.
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that the exclusive competence of a single society in any given case128 did not create any 
incentive for performing rights societies to increase efficiency or reduce their costs. The 
cross-licensing arrangements foreseen in these Agreements thus led to an effective lock up of 
national territories, transposing into the Internet the national monopolies the societies had 
traditionally held in the offline world, monopolies that were no longer justified in the digital 
environment. For this reason, the Commission preliminarily ruled that the Santiago 
Agreements did not meet the conditions required by Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. While 
most performing rights societies strongly opposed the ruling of the Commission, SABAM and 
BUMA did not; both agreed that the economic residency requirement infringed the freedom 
of movement mandated by the EC Treaty. In letters dated April 20 and May 10, 2005, BUMA 
and SABAM respectively declined to be a party to any licensing agreement for online use 
containing an economic residence clause129. 
The Commission ruling is only a preliminary one and proceedings are still pending. 
The investigations have currently been suspended due to the legislative process undertaken by 
another institution within the European Union, the Internal Market and Services Directorate 
General. While the Directorate General for Competition was investigating the Santiago and 
Barcelona Agreements, the Directorate General for Internal Market had indeed initiated a 
survey related to copyright management in the European Union130. For the Directorate, 
creating a regulatory framework for copyright management was a logical step after achieving 
128
 i.e. the one where the user has its actual and economic location.
129 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/fr/oj/2005/c_200/c_20020050817fr00110012.pdf. 
130
 Communication from The Commission to The Council, The European Parliament and The European 
Economic and Social Committee, COM(2004) 261 final, April 16, 2004, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004_0261en01.pdf. 
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substantive harmonization through the different directives131. The survey concluded that 
abstaining from legislative action was no longer a viable option132. Such was not the opinion 
of performing rights societies which, through GESAC, considered the enactment of a 
Directive on the collective management of copyright inappropriate133; the societies were of 
the opinion that the music industry was undergoing rapid and constant changes, and that it 
was up to the market, not to the legislator, to meet the demand for pan-European licenses. 
According to the societies, the Santiago and Barcelona Agreements represented a market-
based solution that satisfied all stakeholders.
In spite of these objections, the Directorate for Internal Market commissioned a study 
on the benefit of cross-border collective management of copyright that was published on July 
7, 2005134. According to the Commission, the gap between 2004 revenues generated by the 
online exploitation of music works in the United States and Europe was primarily due to the 
structure of collective societies, which limited the scope of licensing by territory135. As we 
have seen in Simulcast and in Santiago, improved regulation of copyright management was 
motivated by the desire to enhance competition among collective societies. Since the 
monopolistic position of these societies was not justified in the digital environment due to the 
cross-border trading of musical works, they had to comply with Art. 81-83 EC Treaty and 
compete with each other. For the Directorate, recent moves aimed at providing users with 
131 COM(2004) 261 final, at 5.
132 Id., at 19.
133 GESAC, COMMUNICATION OF APRIL 16, 2004 ON THE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN 
THE INTERNAL MARKET, June 2004, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/consultation-rights-
management/gesac_en.pdf. 
134 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STUDY ON A COMMUNITY INITIATIVE ON THE CROSS-BORDER 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT, July 2005, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/study-collectivemgmt_en.pdf. 
135 Id., at 5.
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multi-territorial licensing were insufficient because they did not enable rights holders to 
comply with the performing rights society of their choice. The study proposed three options: 
(1) do nothing and let the market operate freely; (2) eliminate territorial restrictions and 
discriminatory provisions in the reciprocal agreements concluded between the societies; (3) 
give rights holders the option to choose the society of their choice to grant online rights for 
the entire EU136. The first option was not seriously taken into consideration by the 
Commission. The second one would have introduced a single entry point and choice for users, 
who could have required a license from any collective society as in the Simulcast Agreement; 
however, this would not have increased competition at the level of the rights holders, which
was the ultimate goal of the Commission. The basic difference between the latter options was 
indeed that option 3 introduced competition in the relationship between right holders and 
collective societies, while option 2 introduced competition at the users’ level137. Obviously, 
the study favored the third option, the only one to actually allow competition at the level of 
the rights holders by giving them the right to join any society138.
The Commission, obviously keen on going forward with the adoption of a directive, 
irritated many by purposefully setting a twenty day deadline in the middle of August to 
receive comments. Though this period is particularly inappropriate for public participation 
because most Europeans are on vacation, 80 organizations submitted comments. Contrary to 
what had been assumed by the Directorate in its study, CISAC pointed out that Article 11 (II) 
of its Model Contract, according to which affiliates had to be nationals of the country in 
136 Id., at 34 et seq.
137 Id., at 40.
138 Id., at 54.
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which their performing rights society operated, had been removed in March 2004139. In other 
words, the primary restriction which had justified an initiative towards cross-border 
management, i.e., the so-called impossibility for rights holders to join the society of their 
choice, simply did not exist. Moreover, the figures demonstrating that revenues generated in 
the United States would be eight times higher than in Europe were misleading because they 
did not take into account several trends. Revenues generated by ring tones are much higher in 
Europe than in the United States, and iTunes had not yet been launched in Europe. As 
expected, collective societies rejected both options 2 and 3. Even though option 2, which 
favored competition at the users’ level, was built upon the reciprocal agreements that had 
been fundamental to collective societies for over 150 years, it enabled users to “forum shop”, 
a situation the societies felt was untenable. Besides, it would lead users to seek out the least 
demanding society, thus encouraging a “race to the bottom” where collective societies became 
less effective because they were cutting costs to be cheaper and thus more attractive to users, 
to the detriment of authors140. To favor competition at the rights holders’ level as retained by 
option 3 was even more worrying because the study concluded that “With respect to cross-
border distribution of offline royalties, we believe that Option 3 will also be the most 
sustainable long-term model”141; in other words, in the long term, the model would also be 
139 CISAC, PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS ON EUROPEAN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT “STUDY ON A 
COMMUNITY INITIATIVE ON THE CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT” 4, July 2005, at 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/DownLoad/kmeVAKJ_miGUbpJEH26CRWRYCx3NtriCkiQAkJdVT-
JQOHHeHf6zk2q2y0-rNHpIbVUB8GNUJuLwovTIbUYIq_4DRRUS7cuq/G6-/CISAC_en.pdf. This provision 
is also at the origin of the investigation launched by the Competition Directorate of the Commission against 
CISAC Model Contract (see
http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=Web-2005-EUSO). 
140 See GESAC, WORKING DOCUMENT OF 7 JULY 2005 FROM THE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR THE INTERNAL 
MARKET ON A COMMUNITY INITIATIVE ON THE CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT –
GESAC’S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS, July 2005, at 
http://www.gesac.org/eng/positions/download/GCOLLECT094ipen05.doc .
141 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 134, at 54.
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extended to the offline exploitation of copyrighted works. The study thus aimed at 
revolutionizing the whole model upon which collective societies had been built. GESAC tried 
to draw the Commission’s attention to several unanticipated consequences of option 3: first, 
large publishers were likely to adhere to foreign collective societies having substantial 
financial resources like GEMA or SACEM, while individuals would remain members of their 
small or medium size national societies; this situation would lead to considerable difficulties 
regarding documentation and distribution of royalties, and thus significantly increase the costs 
of management. Second, contrary to the Commission’s prediction, to favor competition at the 
rights holders’ level threatened small collective societies and, consequently, cultural 
diversity142.
Unfortunately for performing rights societies, the battle was lost almost before it 
began. The Commission unsurprisingly considered that favoring competition at the rights 
holders’ level was the most promising to enhance competition and satisfy the needs of 
stakeholders. However, in a nod to the strong opposition, the Commission turned the foreseen 
directive into a Recommendation on September 30, 2005143. The Recommendation’s main 
provisions for our purpose are the third and fifth ones:
“3. Right-holders should have the right to entrust the management of any of the online rights necessary 
to operate legitimate online music services, on a territorial scope of their choice, to a collective rights 
142
 GESAC, supra note 140, at 19 et seq.
143
 Commission Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services, at 
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manager of their choice, irrespective of the Member State of residence or the nationality of either the 
collective rights manager or the right-holder.
[…]
5. With respect to the licensing of online rights the relationship between right-holders and collective 
rights managers, whether based on contract or statutory membership rules, should at least be governed 
by the following: (a) right-holders should be able to determine the online rights to be entrusted for 
collective management; (b) right-holders should be able to determine the territorial scope of the 
mandate of the collective rights manager; (c) right-holders should, upon reasonable notice of their 
intention to do so, have the right to withdraw any of the online rights and transfer the multi territorial 
management of those rights to another collective rights manager, irrespective of the Member State of 
residence or the nationality of either the collective rights manager or the right-holder; (d) where a right-
holder has transferred the management of an online right to another collective rights managers, without 
prejudice to other forms of cooperation among rights managers, all collective rights managers 
concerned should ensure that those online rights are withdrawn from any existing reciprocal 
representation agreement concluded amongst them.”
How did performing rights societies react to the adoption of this recommendation?
2. Performing Rights Societies’ Concerns
a) General Remarks
At first glance, the Recommendation may not seem to change much to the current 
situation. After all, unlike what the Commission thought, Art. 11 II of the CISAC Model 
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Contract no longer existed. Moreover, GEMA had already made it clear in 1971 that rights 
holders could join any performing rights society within the Community and were allowed to 
allocate their rights to different societies in different territories144. In 1993, U2 had confirmed 
that authors had the right to withdraw their affiliation and individually manage their 
copyrights145. Yet performing rights societies were worried because the central licensing 
agreements encouraged by the Recommendation made much more sense in the online world 
than offline, and because it enabled the “central” society to deliver cross-border licenses 
without the need to refer to reciprocal agreements, thus threatening the territorial structure 
upon which performing rights societies have been built.
During the interviews, European performing rights societies wondered whether cross-
border licensing is a model that is responsive to actual needs of users. GEMA and SACEM 
explain that “most users are interested in the deliverance of local licenses rather than cross-
border ones”. For example, in July 2005, GEMA stated that only two out of 41 ring tone 
companies and zero online music store had requested a cross-border license; for instance, 
while GEMA offered Apple a license covering Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and 
Switzerland, the company, assuming that GEMA would apply its high rate to these countries 
as well, refused and sought the cheaper licenses from each country146. While large users like 
iTunes may be able to suffer the necessary transaction costs to negotiate with each collective 
society, most small players will not. Interestingly, SUISA points out that “cross-border 
licenses might paradoxically favor small users who are financially unable to seek licenses 
from different performing rights societies”. Another hindrance to the development of cross-
144 See supra Part II B Did You Say Collective Societies – Nature and Ownership.
145 See supra Part II B Did You Say Collective Societies – Nature and Ownership.
146
 Information provided by GEMA.
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border licenses might be the language of users’ websites; for instance, JASRAC explains that, 
in general, its users provide services to the Japanese public in Japanese, so that there is no real 
practical need for cross-border licenses. 
In spite of these observations, cross-border licenses can be expected to gain traction 
over years as proved by the central licensing agreement that was announced during the annual 
session of MIDEM in Cannes on January 23, 2006 by GEMA and PRS/MCPS, according to 
which EMI Music Publishing had decided to work with them to build a one-stop shop to clear 
the rights of EMI’s Anglo-American songs across Europe for online and mobile usage147. The 
possibility for European performing rights societies to conclude central licensing agreements 
with right holders and, as a result, to deliver cross-border licenses to users raises concerns of 
both small, medium and large performing rights societies:
b) Small performing rights societies concerns
Whether large or small, the performing rights societies interviewed agree that, by 
encouraging central licensing agreements, the Recommendation endangers the role of 
reciprocal agreements and, consequently, threatens the existence of numerous small and 
medium performing rights societies. As stated by SABAM, “major publishers now have a 
clear interest in reducing transaction costs by assigning all their rights to large performing 
rights societies such as GEMA, PRS or SACEM and closing the local offices of their sub-
publishers”. The disappearance of local sub-publishers, better informed about local needs, 
may ultimately impoverish cultural diversity, a result that conflicts with the recent signature 
147 http://www.gema.de/engl/communication/press_releases/pm20060123.shtml. 
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by performing rights societies of the UNESCO Convention, whose main purpose is to 
recognize and celebrate the importance of cultural diversity148. The utilitarian approach taken 
by the European Commission would thus be unable to properly consider the multiple 
functions performed by the societies, in particular their cultural and social roles. 
SUISA, another small performing right society, obviously shares SABAM’s concerns, 
with one major difference: unlike SABAM, SUISA does not believe that individual authors 
would be influenced by the majors to join large performing rights societies. The Swiss 
performing right society believes that proximity matters for individuals, a feeling also shared 
by SACEM. The rights of authors to assign their rights to any society since GEMA  was never 
really used; according to SUISA, “in practice, it is important for individuals to be in direct 
contact with their local society, with whom they share a common language and have 
developed trust”.  For the Swiss performing rights society, the recommendation may lead to 
the development of a dual system: one for the majors, whose rights would be assigned to large 
performing rights societies, and one for individuals, who would remain affiliated to their local 
society. As a result, small performing rights societies would be unable to offer the majors’ 
repertoires and would be limited to the management of only their members’ works, a far less 
attractive and lucrative situation for users. Deprived of their primary source of revenue, small 
and medium size societies may no longer be viable.
GEMA, which has also opposed option 3, concedes that this risk may exist. However, 
at this stage, “any such assertions would be merely speculative”. For GEMA, “cultural 
148
 This fear was reinforced by a delegation of six prominent songwriters and music composers who, in February 
2006, addressed the European Commission to defend their rights and shared their fears that the Recommendation 
may indeed undermine cultural diversity and their longstanding and effective relationship with performing rights 
societies (see http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=web-
2006-02-McCreevy). 
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diversity has already disappeared to a great extent without any centralization; such is the case 
in particular with radio stations, which do not offer a wide repertoire, instead performing the 
same hits days and nights”. 
In its impact assessment report published on October 10, 2005, the Commission 
sweeps these fears aside and states that, to the contrary, the retained option will allow all 
societies to compete for members irrespective of their nationality or domicile. Therefore, a 
performing rights society which does not have a strong repertoire may attract rights holders 
from other jurisdictions based on its efficiency149. One cannot deny this possibility, as the 
central licensing agreement concluded on April 30, 2004 between SABAM and Universal for 
eighteen months proves150. However, the parallel drawn by the Commission between costs 
and efficiency is strongly criticized by all performing rights societies interviewed, which 
unanimously agree that their efficiency cannot be mirrored by their costs. It depends on what 
services societies perform for those costs, and their effectiveness in performing those services. 
Far from being a sign of efficiency, administration costs significantly lower than the one 
charged by sister societies are likely to reflect less valuable management to the detriment of 
the rights holders151. GEMA in particular insists on pointing out that “monitoring copyrighted 
works, auditing users, compiling necessary documentation, drafting detailed reports and 
setting up DRM are expensive, much more so than the European Commission seems to 
149 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, IMPACT ASSESSMENT REFORMING CROSS-BORDER 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR LEGITIMATE ONLINE MUSIC SERVICES 30, 
October 2005, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/sec_2005_1254_en.pdf.
150 http://www.sabam.be/website/data/universalangl.doc. According to SABAM, the agreement was considered 
to be an experimental one. It will however not be renewed, for reasons that have not been disclosed.
151 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 47 § 100 and 57 § 127. Eliminating a satisfactory quality of documentation and 
reporting leads to a higher risk that the royalties will be distributed to the wrong right holders, thus leading to 
deficient collective management.
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believe”. One cannot logically require collective societies to produce a complete census and 
simultaneously reduce their administration costs, as the European Commission does. 
Small and medium size performing rights societies know that they will not be able to 
afford the costly infrastructure described above if they are forced to compete without the 
majors’ repertoires. If central licensing agreements develop as can be expected, small and 
medium performing rights societies are likely to have no choice but to reduce their costs to 
survive. Questioned as to possible solutions to reduce their costs of management, GEMA and 
SABAM consider that small societies will have to combine their resources and create joint 
ventures to consolidate technical investments and back office administration. Joint ventures 
have already been created among collective societies, both at the national and international 
level: for example, PRS/MCPS, SACEM/SDRM and BUMA/STEMRA share certain 
elements of management regarding the common exploitation of performing and mechanical 
rights152. On the international scene, several cooperative agreements have been signed: 
between SABAM and BUMA/STEMRA regarding the joint management of mechanical 
rights and IT support, data synchronization and process harmonization153, in the Carribean 
region154 and the International Music Joint Venture (IMJV) put in place by PRS/MCPS, 
BUMA/STEMRA, ASCAP and SOCAN to use a single shared database155. 
c) Large (potentially central) performing rights societies’ concerns
152 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 49 § 106.
153 http://cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=CN-2004-04-SABAM-
BUMA. 
154 FICSOR, supra note 21, at 121 § 328.
155 Remark by Tony Pool (Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers Ltd.), in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 232 (2002).
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While the situation is particularly worrying for small performing rights societies, 
larger ones also expressed some concerns during the interviews. GEMA believes that 
“delivering cross-border licenses is one thing, but monitoring the exploitation of works 
performed in other countries is entirely different”. The European Competition is wrong in its 
belief that DRM are a solution to every problem. Several management steps still must be 
performed offline: how can one society granting a cross-border license confirm that 
documentation provided by users accurately reflects the exploitation that took place? Auditing 
will obviously be required. Who will be entrusted to audit the accounting of users located in 
other countries and speaking different languages? For GEMA, the “central” society “must 
have access to users’ location to check the configuration of their IT support and DRM to 
determine whether reports accurately reflect the consumption of musical works. 
Circumvention by users who would put in place their own infrastructure is very easy and, in 
most cases, access to users’ software is impossible”. GEMA concedes that it already faces 
difficulties getting reports from German ring tone companies156, and wonders how to 
effectively safeguard its members’ interests at the international level. If users refuse to pay 
their royalties, how could enforcement be achieved? Would the granting society have 
standing in other countries to sue the users? These are serious practical hindrances against an 
effective cross-border management 157. Strangely enough, at a time when competition between 
performing rights societies has significantly increased, the need for cooperation and 
information sharing has never been so urgent.
156
 GEMA mentions the fact that it had requested ring tone companies to insert a chip in their software to 
precisely monitor the exploitation of works. The companies however did not want that level of transparency and 
refused, arguing that this chip would lead to interoperability problems with their software.
157 See also GESAC, GESAC ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF MRS MERCEDES ECHERER ON “COLLECTING 
SOCIETIES” 11, March 2003, at 
http://www.gesac.org/eng/positions/download/GCOLLECT039EN03QUESTECHERER.doc (cited ANSWERS).
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Finally, SUISA draws our attention to the fact that the delivery of central licensing 
agreements will raise concern regarding the scope of the rights covered by these agreements: 
“In practice, one author may already have assigned its rights to a society before contracting 
with a publisher. In this case, the agreement between the author and publisher can obviously 
not cover the rights which have already been assigned to a performing rights society. In the 
traditional license model, the issue to know whether the rights upon a certain work are 
managed by the performing rights society of the author or the one of the publisher does not 
matter, since each performing rights society monitors a worldwide repertoire on its own 
territory based upon reciprocal agreements. The situation gets different in the case of central 
licensing agreements, where the “central” performing rights society will have to find whether 
all the works of a given author are covered by the central licensing agreement or not, since it 
will only be entitled to deliver cross-border licenses for the works covered by the agreement”. 
According to SUISA, this delimitation didn’t need to be made previously and will involve 
significant transaction costs, thus creating a serious practical hindrance.
d) Towards a New Environment
All in all, performing rights societies agree that the adoption of the EU 
Recommendation changes the atmosphere and has an impact upon their prior solidarity. 
Competition increases at several levels: performing rights societies do not only have to 
compete against each other, with the large and small societies seeking different goals, but also 
have to confront the major publishers. While DRM may serve the interests of collective 
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societies and help solve the problems described above as well as enhance cooperation158, they 
can also be implemented by the rights holders themselves. Should DRM be regarded as a step 
towards individual management, and consequently the demise of collective management?
3. Digital Rights Management (DRM): a Friendly Enemy?
According to Professor Hugenholtz, “Copyright levy systems have been premised on 
the assumption that private copying of protected works cannot be controlled and exploited 
individually. With the advent of DRM, this assumption must be re-examined. In the digital 
environment, technical protection measures and digital rights managements systems make it 
increasingly possible to control how individuals use copyrighted works”159. Therefore, the 
possibilities conferred to rights holders to directly control the exploitation of their works 
through DRM should enable them to fully exercise their exclusive rights. Thanks to DRM, the 
implementation of exceptions (such as private use) and levies on blankets or devices that go 
with them could be phased out. Rights holders would thus be in a position to get better 
compensation than they used to get through the levies distributed by collective societies. 
Individual management could thus replace collective management.
Questioned about Hugenholtz’ position and the possible implementation of DRM as a 
substitute to collective management, performing rights societies share the same viewpoint; 
whether European, American or Japanese, they strongly reject Hugenholtz’ assertions, for 
several reasons. First, individual management is extremely costly and even prohibitive for a 
158
 Daniel Gervais, The Evolving Role(s) of Copyright Collectives, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END 
OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES? 27, 41 (Christoph Beat Graber et al. ed., 2005).
159 Bernt Hugenholtz/Lucie Guibault/Sjoerd van Geffen, The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment, 1 and 
10 et seq,  at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf (2003).
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vast majority of authors. Second, to monitor the exploitation of the works requires an 
expertise that rights holders do not have. Third, European performing rights societies in 
particular believe they play an important social role. They represent a lobbying force to 
negotiate against powerful users with far more leverage than the authors alone160. Without 
performing rights societies, authors would be at the mercy of users and producers. 
If individuals do not have the financial resources and expertise to manage the
exploitation of their works, one may wonder why the major publishers could not withdraw 
their repertoire from these societies, self-monitor the exploitation of their repertoire and 
thereby increase their profit margins. Among the societies interviewed, only SUISA concedes 
that this possibility raises serious long term concerns. ASCAP however wonders “Why a 
publisher would feel like engaging the costs of direct licensing when there is an amazingly 
effective system [i.e. collective management] at disposal? Far from increasing their profit 
margin, publishers might lose money”161. 
Performing rights societies have suggested two factors that may indeed prevent 
publishers from engaging in individual management, at least on a short-term basis: 
First, users do not want to acquire several licenses from different entities; they want to 
exploit a worldwide repertoire with only a single license. Performing rights societies are still 
the only entities to provide such a service. While it is true that the majors may agree among 
themselves to offer a similar service in the future, such agreements would suffer two 
160 Opinion shared by Thierry Desurmont (SACEM), in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ENTERTAINMENT 
LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 203 (2002); Gervais, supra note 158, at 31.
161
 This view is shared by several prominent scholars in this field: FICSOR, supra note 21, at 97-98 § 260 et seq., 
considers that, far from decreasing, the role of joint management will probably increase; Adolf Dietz, Rationales 
of Copyright and Collective Administration in the Information Society (comment), in DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES? 57 et seq. (Christoph Beat Graber et al. ed., 2005). See also 
Alfred Meyer (chief executive of SUISA), DRMS Do Not Replace Collecting Societies (comment), in DIGITAL 
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES? 61 et seq. (Christoph Beat Graber et al. ed., 2005).
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shortcomings: they would most likely be considered a concerted practice that would fall under 
the scrutiny of competition authorities due to the dominant position of the majors162, and 
would probably lead to an increase in the amount of royalties sought, thus encouraging 
opposition from users. Regardless, this first argument seems pretty weak. The United States 
example clearly demonstrates that the need to acquire a reasonable number of licenses is not a 
serious hindrance for users; the situation of iTunes, which preferred to acquire several 
licenses rather than to accept the single one proposed by GEMA for Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland is another example. Truth remains that users have a similar interest as rights 
holders to the existence of performing rights societies. 
A second argument is more decisive. All performing rights societies agree that there is 
no uniform standard for DRM so far, and that companies are unlikely to reach an agreement. 
At this stage, the establishment of a global and interoperable technical infrastructure on DRM 
systems based on a consensus among the stakeholders is far from being achieved163. A study 
published in July 2004 by the High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, a study 
group created by the European Commission, states that “the timescale to see meaningful 
progress towards mass-market deployment of interoperable solutions would likely be in the 
162
 This assumption is confirmed by the class action lawsuit brought in March 2006 by Bulcao et al. v. Sony 
BMG Music Entertainment et al. in the Northern District Court of California against the major records labels, 
alleging federal and state antitrust violations based upon an alleged conspiracy to fix inflated prices in the online 
music space that would restrain the availability of online music (see http://www.svmedialaw.com/cat-
content.html, http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/internet/0,39020774,39316239,00.htm, of March 3, 2006). 
163
 The opinion of the performing rights societies is shared by the European Commission: see supra note 313, at 
10-11, as well as by some scholars: John Palfrey, Holding Out for an Interoperable DRM Standard, in DIGITAL 
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING SOCIETIES? 1 et seq. (Christoph Beat Graber et al. ed., 2005); 
Reinhold Kreile/Jürgen Becker, Rechtsdurchsezung und Rechteverwaltung durch Verwertungsgesellschaften in 
der Informationsgesellschaft, 4,  in GEMA Jahrbuch 2000/2001, available at 
http://www.gema.de/kommunikation/jahrbuch/jahr_00_01/themadesjahres.shtml. 
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range of two to five years”164. In addition to what precedes, GESAC adds that “DRM are not 
by themselves a satisfactory solution to the needs of protection of authors in term of control of 
the exploitation of their works, court proceedings, fight against piracy, negotiation of fair 
terms of remuneration with users etc…”165. According to GESAC, for the time being no user 
suggests that DRM could effectively replace authors’ societies in rights management166. 
Universal even shares this opinion, believing that “collective licensing may well have a future 
and certainly is a viable business model for licensing in the context of on-line delivery 
mechanisms. In fact it may be the only viable method of licensing. It remains to be seen 
whether the existing copyright societies can reform themselves sufficiently to be able to 
deliver collective licensing in this context, or whether the members should seek alternative 
collective solutions”167. For these reasons, performing rights societies firmly believe the 
solutions offered by scholars, according to which levy schemes could be abandoned thanks to 
DRM and possibilities of individual management168, are totally unrealistic.
Performing rights societies are nevertheless deeply aware that their business model, 
based upon 19th century needs, has to be adapted to the needs of the digital environment. 
Performing rights societies view DRM not as a competitor but as “a helpful tool that 
164 HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, FINAL REPORT 11, March-July 2004, at  
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/doc/040709_hlg_drm_2nd_
meeting_final_report.pdf.  
165 GESAC, WORKSHOP OF 28 FEBRUARY 2002 ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 2, April 2002, at 
http://www.gesac.org/eng/positions/drmdowload/drm2002.doc (cited WORKSHOP). 
166 GESAC, CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT FOR CREATIVITY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION: PROFILE, 
PERCEPTION, AWARENESS 4, August 2004, at 
http://www.gesac.org/ENG/NEWS/others/download/OTHERSEN_20040620_Conference%20on%20copyright
%20in%20Dublin.doc. 
167
 Remark by Crispin Evans (Universal Music Publishing), in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
ENTERTAINMENT LAWYERS, COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 209 (2002).
168 See in particular: Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1et seq. (2004);
Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment, to be published in 28 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. __(2005), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=801124; 
Hugenholtz et al., supra note 159.
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facilitates the identification and accurate tracking of the use of works”169. They are already 
used to a great extent in the United States: in August 2005, BMI acquired a digital audio 
recognition technology called BlueArrow, which enables BMI to accurately measure the 
performance of music on radio, television and the Internet170; and ASCAP uses Mediaguide, a 
digital verification device to track the use of various music by US radio stations171. ASCAP 
claims that, thanks to these technological tools, the sample gets closer to a complete census. 
However, the use of DRM is not limited to tracking the exploitation of music works on radio 
stations or television channels. In November 2005, BUMA/STEMRA announced that they 
had reached an agreement with the Dance Music Interest Association to digitally monitor the 
exploitation of works during live events172. International initiatives also exist. One of the most 
ambitious projects to respond to the challenges of digital technology is the CISAC’s Common 
Information System (CIS), whose goal is to create a database that would be accessible to any 
performing right society. This database would enable societies to track music works using 
only a single identification number in any area of the world173.
In conclusion, stakeholders agree that DRM are unlikely to replace performing rights 
societies. Far from being viewed as a competitor, the societies believe that DRM will help 
them to adapt their structure to this new environment. Technological tools will enable them to 
169
 Results of interviews (quote from GEMA) confirmed by GESAC, ANSWERS, supra note 157, at 6. 
170 http://www.bmi.com/news/200508/20050830a.asp. 
171 http://www.mediaguide.com. This entity is 50% owned by ASCAP. According to ASCAP, the database 
contains millions of sound recordings which have been digitally fingerprinted. The device tunes in to all radio 
stations and analyzes the signal that is being broadcast. It digitally fingerprints the signal, identifies it and 
compares it with the one in the database, without any input from radio broadcasters.
172 http://www.cisac.org/web/content.nsf/Builder?ReadForm&Page=Article&Lang=EN&Alias=web-2005-
bumadance. 
173 See as to the CIS project: FICSOR, supra note 21, at 101 et seq. § 273 et seq.; UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27,
at 52 et seq. § 252 et seq. For other examples of technological tools used by performing rights societies at the 
national or international level, see GESAC, HEARING ON COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS 9, April 2001, at 
http://www.gesac.org/eng/positions/download/GCOLLECTHEARINGNOV2001069en01.doc. 
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operate with more efficiency by enhancing cooperation and transparency through the creation 
of common standards and IT support in particular.
4. Current Practice of Performing Rights Societies174
a) Introduction
BMI and ASCAP started to license online exploitation of musical works in 1995. 
Today, all performing rights societies interviewed deliver online licenses. Until December 31, 
2004, European performing rights societies and BMI were applying the Santiago Agreement 
and thus delivering pan-European licenses to users who had their economical residence in 
their territory. Considering the Statement of Objections delivered in April 2004 by the 
European Competition Commission, the societies decided not to renew the Agreement after 
its initial term set on December 31, 2004.
Since January 1, 2005, European performing rights societies have returned to the 
traditional single license model, which is also used by the United States and Japan. With a 
single territorial license model, performing rights societies deliver blanket licenses covering a 
worldwide repertoire, but limited to the territories of their competence175. Theoretically, 
performing rights societies could also deliver worldwide licenses for their own local 
members’ works; however, a dual system that would establish cross-border licenses for the 
174
 By “performing rights societies”, I mean the performing rights societies interviewed, and do not claim that the 
practice described is followed by any other performing rights society.
175
 For instance, ASCAP can deliver licenses for the United States, its territories and possessions, and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, SUISA for Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and SACEM for France, Luxembourg 
and Monaco.
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local repertoire and licenses limited to their territory for the repertoires of their sister societies 
would be too cumbersome to monitor, without mentioning the difficulties to identify one’s 
own repertoire.
b) The granting of territorial licenses in the absence of central licensing agreements
In the absence of central licensing agreements, performing rights societies thus grant 
licenses limited to their own territory. As a consequence, it is important to understand the 
criteria referred to by these societies to define their competence. Interviews demonstrate a 
lack of uniformity so that the criterion will differ from one society to another: the first, used 
by JASRAC and SABAM, considers the residence of users as decisive. In other words, a user 
located in Japan or Belgium will have to ask for a license from JASRAC or SABAM, even 
though the services would not be provided to the Japanese or Belgium public. The location of 
the server is not considered relevant, because of the “forum-shopping” it would encourage in 
users. A second point of attachment relates to the origin of the transmission; this criterion is 
used by ASCAP which, according to article 6 lit. c of its experimental license agreement for 
Internet sites176, is competent to grant a license to any user whose signal originates from the 
United States or its possessions. In other words, ASCAP is “not competent to deliver a license 
to a US company whose signal is transmitted from its facilities in the United Kingdom”. 
Under the third criterion, the point of destination (end-user principle) is decisive. This 
viewpoint has been adopted by SACEM, which considers its competence justified each time a 
user provides its services to the French public. SABAM also attaches importance to the 
176 http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/. 
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market as an alternative to the residence of users, since it considers the existence of a domain 
name registered under the “.be” ccTLD as relevant to define its competence.  Finally, BMI 
and SUISA consider both the points of origin and of destination to be relevant criteria, since 
both constitute points of attachment to their territories. 
Example: 
A French company originates its transmission from Belgium to provide its services to the US and Swiss 
markets. The French company will neither have to ask for a license from SACEM, since the services are 
not offered to the French public, nor to ASCAP, since the transmission does not originate from the US. 
While the transmission originates from Belgium, SABAM does not consider the point of origin to be a 
relevant criterion, so that the French company does not need the deliverance of a license from SABAM 
either. Considering the fact that it offers its services to the US and Swiss markets, the French company 
will have to acquire a license from BMI and SUISA, because both these societies consider the point of 
destination to be a relevant criterion to define their competence.
While practice shows that users assume the point of destination to be the relevant 
criterion and thus acquire a license in each country where they intend to provide their 
services, the application review process is far from harmonious. The relevant criteria can vary 
with each society and with each country. Such a solution may lead to disputes: for instance, a 
Belgium company that would originate its transmission from the United States for the French 
market should not only acquire a license from SACEM (point of destination), but from 
SABAM (economic residence) and ASCAP (point of origin) as well. There is no doubt that a 
common standard would be highly desirable to achieve legal certainty. According to 
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SABAM, discussions would be taking place among performing rights societies on these 
points since the adoption of the EU Recommendation.
c) The applicable rate schedule(s) in case of a central licensing agreement
When rights holders sign a central licensing agreement with a performing rights 
society to assign all their rights on a worldwide basis, the society will have the ability to offer 
cross-border licenses to users. Since the works will be exploited in different countries, 
presumably with different cost structures, one may wonder whose rate schedule will apply. 
Does the granting society apply its rate schedule, no matter where the exploitation takes place, 
or will it apply the rate schedule used by the relevant society in each country where the works 
are exploited? Performing rights societies dealing with offline central licensing agreements 
have always applied the second alternative, in compliance with the principle of the country of 
destination. In the first online central licensing agreement ever concluded between Universal 
and SABAM, the latter however unilaterally decided to apply its own rate schedule for all 
performances, without the prior consent of its sister societies177. Performing rights societies 
strongly reacted to what was considered a violation of the principle of the country of 
destination. While SABAM points out that the licensing agreement never gave rise to any 
concern from competition authorities and was perfectly valid178, it did defer to the strong 
177 http://www.sabam.be/website/data/universalangl.doc.
178
 One should view this assertion with a critical eye. Art. 41 of the Swiss Copyright Act requires anyone who 
administers copyrights to have an authorization granted by the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property, which 
confirms that the concerned entity fulfils certain requirements. By managing the online exploitation of 
Universal’s repertoire in Switzerland, SABAM obviously violated this provision since it did not have any 
authorization from SUISA. Generally speaking, the application of one’s rate schedule without the prior consent 
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reaction of its sister societies and now recognizes that “negotiations among collective 
societies are always needed to conclude cross-border licenses”. Several proposed cross-border 
licenses have already been negotiated and finalized: iTunes got a license from SACEM 
covering not only France, Luxembourg and Monaco, but also Belgium; telecommunication 
companies such as Nokia and Ericson also received cross-border licenses from the performing 
rights society of their respective countries for mobile phone use of the world music repertoire. 
The country of destination is a key consideration for performing rights societies, 
whose primary goal is to protect their own members. Accordingly, they assert that their rate 
schedule will have to apply to every exploitation that takes place in their country. Technically, 
the geographical scope of a cross-border license may cover the entire European Union, but the 
granting society will thus have no choice but to apply 25 different rate schedules to take into 
account the geographical exploitation of the works. 
To avoid the application of several rate schedules by the granting society, European 
performing rights societies would favor the adoption of a pan-European rate schedule. Such a 
solution is at least several years in the future according to GEMA and SACEM, which still 
consider the online distribution of music works to be at its infancy. Due to the differential 
penetration of online music distribution in various countries, these societies believe a 
centralized rate structure is premature. The French society adds that collective societies take 
several factors into consideration each time they adopt a rate schedule179, including social and 
economical conditions and previous existing rate schedules. Though each country is different, 
of sister societies infringes the principle of territoriality, according to which one should refer to the applicable 
regulations of the concerned country for any act occurring in this country.
179 See supra Part II B : Did You Say Collective Societies ? – Granting Licenses.
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SUISA hopes that harmonization among countries with similar socio-economical conditions 
is nevertheless possible. The European Competition Commission would most likely favor the 
adoption of a common rate schedule as proved by Simulcast, where the rate schedule was an 
aggregate of the rates applicable in the different countries, provided however that the rate 
clearly makes a distinction between the royalty and the commission so as to enhance 
competition180.
In practice, the current diversity among applicable rate schedules is not a significant 
hindrance. Since Lucazeau, the imposition of significantly higher tariffs than those applicable 
in other European Member States constitutes an abuse of dominant position, unless the 
differences are justified by objective and relevant factors181. As a result, the applicable rates 
as to the online exploitation of copyrighted works are very similar in the European Union:
180 UCHTENHAGEN, supra note 27, at 59 § 292 correctly points out that a shared rate schedule without any 
distinction between the royalty and the commission would most probably be considered a concerted practice by 
competition authorities.
181 Lucazeau v. SACEM, decision of July 13, 1989, cases 110/88 and 241/88, ECR (1989) 2811. See supra note 
75.
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The applicable rates among European performing rights societies are thus nearly 
identical190, with the notable exception of Germany. Questioned as to the rationale for this 
difference, GEMA answers that “current rates are far too low and no longer reflect the value 
of the rights holders’ contributions”. According to the German society, “labels get up to 70% 
of the revenues generated, causing unreasonable financial loss for artists; a rate of 
approximately 20% would be the ideal”. SUISA agrees that current rates do not reflect market 
realities in music distribution where music prices are getting cheaper each year thanks to 
technological innovations. Article 60 of the Swiss Copyright however mandates that the 
royalty should not exceed 10% except under exceptional circumstances. An amendment may 
therefore be necessary to raise rates to appropriate levels. SACEM ambitiously intends to 
increase its rate to 12% over the next years, a policy that GEMA and SABAM deem 
unrealistic given the historical difficulties in raising rates once they are set.
The rates of European performing rights societies nevertheless show slight 
differences. For instance, SUISA and GEMA are the only European societies that consider the 
length of the music downloaded191. Unlike SACEM, which requires an additional royalty of 
100€ per month if pre-listening is possible, SABAM does not require any additional royalty 
for pre-listening. On the other hand, GEMA has a special rate schedule for pre-listening, i.e., 
the streaming of works up to 45 seconds for sampling purposes192. All these differences are 
considered as minor by SACEM, according to whom “the management of cross-border 
licenses should not lead to a significant cost increase”.
Differences in the rest of the world are more significant than in Europe. To compare 
the situation among these performing rights societies, the table only refers to blanket usage 
license agreements delivered for commercial purposes. Rates are however structured 
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differently from one continent to another. In Japan, JASRAC has a particularly detailed rate 
schedule regarding interactive transmissions and distinguishes whether the license agreement 
is a blanket one or not, whether the service is commercial in nature or not and the type of 
works downloaded (sound recordings or lyrics or other). The Japanese rate schedules were 
negotiated between the Japanese collective society and a trade organization representing 
online music service operators, Network Music Rights Conference (NMRC). According to 
JASRAC, the existence of NMRC as a representative entity leads the prosperity of the 
Japanese market for online distribution of music. In the United States, ASCAP and BMI both 
refer to sampling methods that not only take into account the number of works consumed, but 
also other factors such as the revenues generated through advertising193.
Since performing rights societies have to comply with the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment, identical rate schedules have to apply to all users conducting similar 
activities on the same market. The societies thus strongly affirm that users cannot re-negotiate 
the royalty rate, unless they can demonstrate that their business model differs from existing 
ones in a way that justifies differential rates. According to SACEM, “users often try to make 
such a demonstration, for instance by stating that their online store differs from iTunes 
because they cannot rely upon revenues generated by the sales of iPods”. Unfortunately for 
them, this argument has been rejected by SACEM since “iPods and iTunes are legally distinct 
from each other”. The definition of the relevant market nevertheless remains a key issue to 
avoid any problem with competition authorities. Separate rate schedules are thus adopted 
every now and then when a new business model appears. While the table only mentions the 
most lucrative ones, performing rights societies have adopted the following rate schedules to 
reflect the different types of online exploitations of musical works: background music on 
62
websites (GEMA, SABAM and SACEM), webcasting (all performing rights societies), video 
on demand (GEMA), podcasting (BMI) and online karaoke for commercial uses (JASRAC). 
While the royalty rate of the license agreements are hardly negotiable, SABAM believes that 
“one could possibly negotiate a discount on the administrative costs, for instance if users 
demonstrate that their revenues exceed a certain amount, or if users provide perfect sales 
reports, which is far from being the case today and leads to an increase of costs of 
management”.
d) The distribution of the royalties in case of a central licensing agreement
   Once performing rights societies have applied a rate schedule and collected the 
royalties in compliance with the principle of the country of destination, they will have to 
distribute the money among the different rights holders. There are two general alternatives for 
this process: either to apply the distribution rules of each country of destination and distribute 
the royalties to the different rights holders, or to allocate the money due to its sister societies 
in the concerned countries, which would then take care of the distribution in compliance with 
their respective distribution rules. The first alternative is considered too expensive by all 
performing rights societies and would ultimately lead to a significant increase of the costs of 
management and, consequently, to lower royalty rates to the prejudice of the rights holders. 
For this reason, the second alternative is the only one applied, both for offline and online 
central licensing agreements. Traditional distribution rules remain applicable since no 
performing right society has adopted specific rules for the online exploitation of musical 
works. 
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The society to which rights holders have assigned all their rights through a central 
licensing agreement will thus allocate the amount due for each country of destination based 
on its own valuation. Therefore, performing rights societies will depend upon the “central” 
society for their share of royalties. In spite of a growing competitive environment, 
cooperation and transparency thus become particularly important. GEMA made it clear that 
its cross-border licenses would have several requirements: “first, users must secure the rights 
to obtain a multi-territorial license (for example the adaptation rights for ring tone 
companies); second, the agreement itself will be subject to strict conditions regarding respect 
of moral rights, reporting and management infrastructure”. Cooperation among performing 
rights societies will be important with the development in online music stores, which makes it 
difficult for societies to audit the accuracy and relevance of sales reports. While one can 
easily appraise the valuation made by a sister society regarding the number of audience 
members in a movie theater, SUISA concedes that “a lack of technical expertise makes it 
difficult to accurately monitor the number of downloads reported”. This lack of 
sophistication194 may result in different claims from performing rights societies against their 
sister societies and protests from users. To resolve disputes related to royalties, GEMA has 
established an arbitration system195 whereby it opens an escrow account with the concerned 
user. The amount in dispute is placed in the escrow account, and the rest directly paid to 
GEMA. In this way, “the user only pays the amount that it considers fair, and the rest is put in 
the escrow account”. After the settlement, the effects of the decision are retroactive and the 
money on the escrow account is distributed in compliance with the decision. According to 
GEMA, “this could be a problem for users like Napster, which contests a substantial amount 
of royalties due, and would thus have to pay a large amount in to the escrow account”.
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While the design of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) will be needed 
to solve cross-border disputes related to the central management of musical works196, ADR 
will not get rid of the necessity to enhance transparency and cooperation among societies. 
Standards, database and form requirements will have to be standardized; at a time of 
centralization, it makes no sense for users to have to complete form reports structured 
differently for each country. Cooperation through the creation and exploitation of common 
database such as the CIS project is thus crucial to register and keep track of performances, as 
well as to avoid duplication on the documentation side to improve efficiency and users’ 
convenience197.
B. Unauthorized Distribution Channels: Enforcement and P2P
The unauthorized distribution of musical works takes place in two ways: through 
unauthorized streaming or downloading websites or through p2p file exchange systems. How 
do performing rights societies approach these channels? How can they improve their 
monitoring systems?
1. Enforcement mechanisms
All performing rights societies interviewed actively prevent the proliferation of illegal 
websites by monitoring the web. GEMA’ surveillance system relies not only on its own staff, 
but also on third parties and lawyers to police the web. SABAM also proactively contacts ring 
tone companies to grant licenses for Belgium. At this stage, revenues generated by online 
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music stores however remain limited198 and do not allow a systematic intervention of 
performing rights societies which focus their efforts on important websites.
Once a website allowing unauthorized performances of musical works is discovered, 
performing rights societies will contact the owner and invite him to request a license. In most 
cases, owners agree. In the few cases where the owners refuse, the societies will request the 
intervention of Internet service providers (ISPs). The ISPs have to react diligently in 
compliance with articles 12-14 of the E-Commerce Directive if they don’t want to be held 
liable for infringement occurring on these websites199. The cooperation of ISPs has even been 
made official in France through the signature in July 2004 of a Charter against piracy200. This 
Charter can be invoked not only to secure the intervention of ISPs against websites’ owners, 
but also against ISPs themselves. It has already been used by SACEM “to oblige access 
providers like Tiscali and Wanadoo to enjoin their advertising campaigns promoting their 
broadband capacities to enable fast downloading of musical works”. On the whole, 
cooperation with ISPs is considered effective by European performing rights societies and 
proves to be an efficient way to legalize the situations. Once an ISP threatens a website owner 
with a shut down of his service, the latter will almost always ask for a license. While this 
cooperation seems to be effective in Japan, ASCAP and BMI remain disappointed with the 
US situation and believe that the safe harbor provisions in section 512 of the DMCA are to 
blame. Though these provisions were supported by these societies at the time of their 
enactment, ASCAP and BMI now believe that “they were not the best way to handle the 
problem”.
While effective, cooperation between ISPs and European performing rights societies is 
more difficult in two situations. First, when the website is hosted abroad, pressure exercised 
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by performing rights societies cannot be as strong as within their territory. In this case, one 
can expect performing rights societies to cooperate to handle these cases within their 
respective territory. Second, ISPs are reluctant to intervene when the unauthorized 
distribution of music occurs through chats, discussions forums or p2p, since they do not 
consider themselves liable for traffic generated by consumers. This scenario led to a lawsuit 
brought by SABAM against Tiscali, an access service provider, in the Tribunal de première 
instance de Bruxelles on June 24, 2004201. SABAM would like a ruling that would require 
ISPs to filter musical works and prevent their transmissions through these websites. On 
November 26, 2004, the Court invited experts to determine whether the technical solutions 
proposed were feasible. While the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles seems to be 
responsive to the arguments raised by SABAM, the case is still pending. Similarly, in July 
2005, GEMA requested that 42 access providers take steps to block access to certain illegal 
websites that enable copyright infringement202; negotiations are ongoing.
2. p2p file exchange systems
The development of authorized platforms like iTunes and lawsuits against consumers 
has led to a decrease of p2p systems usage203, but the exchange of musical files will continue 
through new means of distributions such as instant messengers or reader devices204. 
Performing rights societies are deeply concerned by this situation but none of them is yet able 
to suggest a miracle way to solve the problem.
Whether American, European or Japanese, performing rights societies all consider the 
actions brought by the RIAA against individuals to be detrimental to public relations. While 
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consumers are without doubt liable for uploading and thus enabling an unauthorized 
distribution of works205, ASCAP considers it more effective to sue providers which actually 
derive benefit from the situation. By analogy, ASCAP states that “one will neither sue a band 
that performs music in a pub without required authorization nor consumers, but the owner 
who ultimately profits from this situation”206. The same should apply on the Internet. ASCAP 
and GEMA nevertheless understand that “the RIAA currently has no alternative to protect its 
members’ interests”. From its perspective, SABAM considers these actions to be mostly 
ineffective, which explains its choice to sue an access provider like Tiscali rather than 
consumers. The goal is however not to shut down the websites - the more people consume 
works, the better it is – but to get fair remuneration for the authors. BMI believes that, if one 
admits that most downloaders are students, “the best way to handle the problem may be to 
launch educational campaigns in schools”.
Performing rights societies feel that only the introduction of a compulsory license can 
improve the situation. Most societies agree that there is a danger of turning exclusive rights 
into remuneration rights, and thereby transforming the right to exclude in a mere right to get 
paid. Some feel that this may lead consumers to believe that they can exchange musical files 
“for free”, but it is the lesser of two evils; they find it hard to imagine any other way to 
receive fair remuneration for their members.
Such a levy already exists in one form or another in some countries. While Japan has 
refused to introduce a rate schedule applicable to reader devices such as MP3 players or 
iPods, Germany and Switzerland already have one. For SUISA, such levy schemes for reader 
devices are all the more important in the digital age because new business models allow the 
consumption of music for a cheaper price, provided that consumers purchase expensive 
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readers to play the works. They are by far the primary source of revenues, and rights holders 
have no reason to be deprived of revenues made possible thanks to their creations.
While compulsory licenses upon blanket media and reader devices are already 
disputed in most countries, things get even worse when one proposes a compulsory license for 
ISPs. GEMA believes that “telecommunication operators should pay royalties for the 
transmission of musical works they facilitate”; according to the German society, “it is time for 
Governments and European authorities to understand that these operators make a lot of 
money through the distribution of illegal content, to the detriment of the rights holders, and 
that they should pay for it”. The French Legislature first seemed to agree; in December 2005, 
the National Assembly proposed a bill that would have compelled ISPs to pay a flat royalty 
rate through their subscription fees, and create a global license upon exchange files systems in 
return. Unlike GEMA, SACEM opposed such a scheme, asserting that a global license would 
not have reflected the actual consumption of each work – which is made possible to a certain 
extent by other compulsory licenses such as the one upon the sales of blank media for 
instance - and would ultimately have been detrimental to the rights holders. On March 9, 
2006, the French Parliament finally rejected the proposal for a global license and decided to 
encourage the development of DRM by keeping the proprietary model as the default 
regime207.
While the introduction of new levy schemes such as those imagined by GEMA, the 
French National Assembly or various scholars208 might be the only way for authors to receive 
fair remuneration for the exploitation of their works through file exchange systems at this 
stage209, compliance with the three steps test enacted in Art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention and 
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10.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is highly doubtful. As stated by Peukert210, these treaties 
mandate exclusive rights and anti-circumvention provisions as the statutory default regime in 
national copyright laws. In other words, one could only give rights holders the choice to 
voluntarily opt for compensation instead of control. To that extent, the solution finally 
retained by the French Parliament to let the rights holders freely choose their mode of 
remuneration fully complies with a voluntary system211.
In any case, without broaching the subject of new levy systems, existing schemes 
already face strong opposition from the software industry as well as manufacturers of 
recording devices and blank media. These industries’ representatives allege that private 
copying schemes could now be phased out in favor of DRM. Several countries seem to be 
responsive to these assertions. The European Commission recently began an investigation into 
the need to adapt the private copy remuneration schemes which exist in 22 out of the 25 
Member States; these schemes would also be under review in other countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico212. However, as previously discussed, DRM are still in 
their infancy and unable to efficiently protect rights holders; collective societies, CISAC, 
BIEM and GESAC in particular, constantly affirm that the abolition of these schemes would 
be detrimental to the rights holders and to creation of works in general213.
Based upon what precedes, one cannot expect a global consensus to emerge to solve 
the problems created by exchange file systems at the international level in the next months. 
This being said, p2p seem to raise more concern for the entertainment industry than for 
authors themselves. Thus, according to a Pew Report published in December 2004, artists are 
divided about file sharing; while a majority believes that unauthorized file sharing of 
copyrighted works should be illegal, most authors use the internet to gain inspiration and do 
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not consider file exchange systems to be a big threat to creative industries214. Whatever the 
solution, collective management is likely to go on playing a significant role. As stated by 
Ficsor, “collective management or some other system of joint exercise of rights, however, is 
also needed in the majority of cases where mere rights to remuneration are recognized, 
namely, in those cases where mass uses are involved or where it is otherwise particularly 
difficult to monitor uses”215. Exchange files systems are a typical example of mass use where 
one finds it hard to imagine that the mere implementation of – possibly – effective DRM in 
the future would be able to solve every problem and allow complete individual management.
IV. CONCLUSION
Collective management plays an important role when high transaction cost prevents 
individual management. The field of musical works is a typical example of mass use where 
rights holders are financially unable to monitor the exploitation of their works. As stated by 
Sinacore-Guinn, “The very fact that collective administration of copyright has become 
standard practice in all developed countries and the vast majority of developing countries 
which have copyright or related rights is in itself evidence that such a method of organization 
serves society well”216. Performing rights societies indeed provide useful services to all 
stakeholders: to authors, by monitoring the exploitation of their works and bargaining on their 
behalf against powerful users or publishers; to publishers, by providing them efficient 
services to monitor the exploitation of their repertoire against moderate fees; to users, by 
enabling them to acquire a single license per territory thanks to reciprocal agreements 
concluded among collective societies (single territorial license model); finally, to society in 
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general, by keeping track of all musical works created so far and encouraging musical 
diversity thanks to their welfare plans and social actions.
The digital age is unlikely to change that premise. While some argue that DRM would 
now enable individual management, performing rights societies consider this assumption to 
be short-sighted. DRM are expensive to put in place and individuals cannot afford them. Even 
though the major publishers may have the financial resources to install such monitoring 
systems, three reasons make individual management unlikely to happen: first, DRM remain 
ineffective and lack the interoperability that would be necessary to allow efficient individual 
management; second, publishers lack technical expertise: to have a piano is one thing, to 
master it is another one; finally, they have no interests to get rid of a system which proved its 
efficiency over the years and which provide them with services for a price possibly cheaper 
than the costs they would have to incur if they were to put monitoring systems in place.
Although the Internet does not yet represent a major source of income in the music 
distribution process, performing rights societies agree that its potential to surpass the 
traditional methods of music delivery over the next decades makes a focus on this area 
imperative. The assumption according to which the development of online music stores will 
likely lead to a substantial increase of the royalties collected on the Internet was confirmed on 
March 13, 2006, when ASCAP announced that revenues generated by online music stores in 
2005 had increased by 50% in comparison with 2004, for a total amount of USD 8.1 
million217. Societies thus recognize that they have to adapt to the digital environment. This 
adaptation takes place at several levels:
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First, societies have to respond to new business models that emerge and react 
accordingly to ensure fair remuneration to their members. While societies had no difficulty in 
enacting new rate schedules for online music stores, webcasting or ring tone companies, 
exchange file systems remain an issue of serious concern. As shown in part III, when new 
modes of exploitation develop, users’ groups usually first try to argue that the new use should 
not be protected and, if that argument fails, then argue that these modes should be made 
subject to nonvoluntary licensing schemes.  History however proves that, to implement these 
remuneration rights, individual management must not only be impractical, but even 
impossible; we saw in part III that the issue of compulsory licenses is directly related to the 
one of private copying, and that these schemes were in particular enacted to respond to the 
development of blank media and reader devices to copy and perform musical works in private 
homes. Unsurprisingly, discussions thus turn around the issue to know whether exchange file 
systems like p2p should be submitted to compulsory licenses. Unlike the situation with blank 
media or reader devices, individual management with these systems however does not appear 
impossible (thanks to the possible implementation of DRM), but merely unpractical. The 
three steps test encompassed in article 9.2 of the Berne Convention and 10.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as well as cases described in part II like GEMA, BRT v. SABAM, U2 or 
Banghalter make it clear that the proprietary regime and individual management through 
exclusive rights has to remain the default one, and that compulsory license schemes related to 
exchange files systems would have to remain voluntary. 
Second, to increase their efficiency and confront the “fragmentation” described by 
Gervais as “the lack of cohesion, standardization, and, to a certain extent, effective 
organization of both copyright law and collective management per se”218, performing rights 
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societies need to set up common IT infrastructure and database such as the CIS project under 
development. In the online world, territorial borders have no role to play; technical 
infrastructure and documentation thus need to be standardized at regional levels if not 
worldwide on the long term. Standardization is also needed as to form reports, which remain 
different in each country and unnecessarily lead to an increase of transaction costs for users. 
Cooperation and transparency will be key factors in this new environment for performing 
rights societies to reduce their costs of management and continue to provide costly efficient 
services to all stakeholders. “Collective” administration may thus lean towards “cooperative” 
and “centralized” administration in the future.
Third, in spite of this necessity for cooperation, European performing rights societies 
will have to evolve in a competitive environment for the first time. The monopoly of these 
societies is justified regarding the offline exploitation of musical works where performances 
occur on a territorial basis. The existence of a single performing rights society per country 
thus makes sense to reduce transaction costs. However, considering the ubiquitous nature of 
the Internet, these monopolies are no longer justified when performances occur online. To 
force performing rights societies to compete against each other, the European Commission 
adopted a Recommendation in September 2005 that enables rights holders to assign all their 
rights for Europe to a single society (central licensing agreement). This society is then entitled 
to grant cross-border licenses to any user, thus erasing the need to maintain reciprocal 
agreements.
By enabling central societies to grant multi-territorial licenses, the European 
Commission leaves no choice to performing rights societies but to compete against each 
other. It is the Commission’s belief that competition will force these societies to reduce their 
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costs and become more efficient. Ultimately, societies should be able to provide better 
services to users for a cheaper price as the management cost should get lower. The result of 
the interviews conducted shows that performing rights societies strongly disagree: first, 
efficiency has not correlation with costs, on the opposite; technical infrastructure and 
common database are costly to put in place, even when they are shared. Second, the 
Commission tries to create an artificial market upon the costs to favor users, while the 
primary goal of performing rights societies is to serve their members’ interests, not the ones 
of the users. Third, centralization endangers the existence of small societies. The reciprocal 
agreements upon which performing rights societies have been built enabled them to maintain 
a local repertoire thanks to the social funds that were, arguably, primarily collected through 
the use of the majors’ repertoires. The possibility given by the Recommendation for central 
societies to grant cross-border licenses however puts an end to the need to refer to reciprocal 
agreements. Deprived from the majors’ repertoires, the management of small societies would 
be limited to the one of their local repertoire. Considering the lack of interest of users for 
repertoires others than the ones of the majors, their viability would be in danger and, 
consequently, cultural diversity as well.
In the end, one may regret the European Commission’s decision to treat music as any 
commodity and to have forgotten the social and cultural significant roles played by European 
performing rights societies since their inception. This utilitarian approach, which mirrors the 
one taken in the United States for decades, contradicts the “droit d’auteur” tradition upon 
which continental copyright legislations are built upon; far from fostering music creation, the 
approach taken by the Commission may favor the Anglo-Saxon repertoire to the detriment of 
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regional repertoires. Ultimately, local genres may thus suffer from this shift of policy in 
copyright management. 
At this stage, several questions remain open: will the traditional utilitarian rationale of 
copyrights, i.e., to provide an incentive for creation, be defeated by the structure imposed by 
political institutions to manage these copyrights? Will the fate of cultural diversity ultimately 
be left to the good will of private initiatives and sponsorships as already is the case for 
classical music? Will public entities have to implement quota regulations and subsidize the 
music industry as already done successfully in France to protect the French movie 
industry219? Or, on the contrary, will the development of digital music encourage music 
creation by substantially reducing transaction costs for authors and enable the growth of niche 
markets? Any answer would be premature. Truth remains that the structure of European 
performing rights societies is likely to change in the coming years, and that this evolution, 
driven by a balance to be found around key concepts like “centralization”, “cooperation” and 
“competition”, may influence the future of music. Strangely, cultural diversity may thus 
depend more upon the way musical works will be managed in the coming years than upon the 
future of copyrights itself. It remains to be hoped that conglomerization of the entertainment 
industry and its lobbying will not weigh the balance towards an impoverishment of cultural
diversity that would ultimately lead to a serious defeat of the very reason of being of 
copyrights.
